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“[It is] probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the history of the
world.”
- Winston Churchill after learning of the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.
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Preface
While an academic work may not include every piece of evidence the author found, the
reader should have faith that the author omitted evidence because it was unnecessary, not
because he or she missed it. I do not speak Hungarian, nor have I ever been to Hungary, so I
cannot make that promise. I found plenty of sources in English (some of which were translated
from Hungarian), but it is only a fraction of what exists. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
once opined: “in order to understand a country one not only needs knowledge of the language,
but one must also be familiar with the culture… Those who don’t have such a cultural insight
will hardly be able to give a reliable and serious opinion on the political debates in another
country.”1 While this is a perfectly reasonable statement there are a few caveats.
First, the Hungarian radical right’s historiography is part of a transnational movement
that whitewashes memory of historical oppressors. In Russia, a majority believes that Stalin was
a better leader than Gorbachev, and the government glorifies him for his leadership during World
War II.2 In Poland the government has moved to criminalize scholarly discussion of Polish
complicity in the Holocaust. Orbán’s Hungary is a particular version of a wider phenomenon that
I have sought to understand. In the United States a portrait of Andrew Jackson—the architect of
the Trail of Tears—sat in President Trump’s oval office. The Trump administration also sought
to rewrite the history of North American slavery and instill young Americans with a “patriotic
education.” The populist radical right is flourishing not only across Europe and North America

“Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio programme “Good Morning Hungary,” The Prime Minister,
Website of the Hungarian Government, May 8 2020, http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orban-onthe-kossuth-radio-programme-good-morning-hungary-15/.
2
David Masci, “In Russia, nostalgia for Soviet Union and positive feelings about Stalin,” Fact Tank, Pew Research
Center, June 29, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/29/in-russia-nostalgia-for-soviet-union-andpositive-feelings-about-stalin/.
1
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but across the globe—in Modi’s India, Bolsonaro’s Brazil, and Erdogan’s Turkey, to name just a
few places. Although I do not bring personal experience with Hungarian public history to the
table, I am a student of the radical right phenomenon more generally, particularly how it has
manifested itself here in the United States.
The second caveat is that although the Hungarian government claims to be turning
inward—allegedly to focus on its own heritage and culture for political inspiration—it is seeking
at the same time to be emblematic; its political model and historical revisionism are for export.
In Hungary, monuments which revive the right-wing interwar regime and its beliefs tower over
tourist sites. The House of Terror, Hungary’s national museum devoted to the victims of fascism
and communism, sees hundreds of thousands of visitors yearly, many of them international. The
museum rejects the common perception that while fascism was evil in conception, communism
was only a miscalculation to serve its message on the insidious nature of leftism. In the words of
Dovid Katz, an expert on “double-genocide” historiography, “As the number of Holocaust
survivors and children of survivors dwindles each year, the new paradigm is ever more easily
transferred to the West by the many thousands who have been exposed to these Eastern
European museums… to those of non-Jewish background, visits often lead to the idea that Soviet
crimes represented the bulk of what is called genocide in the area.”3 Hungary’s historical
revisionism is significant internationally regardless of an individual’s familiarity with Hungarian
history, culture, and politics because it seeks to alter assumptions about twentieth-century
atrocity across the world.

Dovid Katz, “Is Eastern European ‘Double Genocide’ Revisionism Reaching Museums?” Dapim: Studies in
Holocaust (2016), 12-13.
3
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Finally, we should push back against the Prime Minister’s assertion that one must be
geographically and culturally embedded in the issues they debate. The historical discipline by its
nature removes evidence from its context, and while political actors are motivated by their
interests, it is the role of the historian to take a more bird’s-eye view of a matter. This is not to
say that I approach the debate without biases, but that I can be open about how they impact my
arguments. Indeed, while I consider myself a liberal, the fact that I have no personal stake in
Hungarian politics helps me to frame the radical right’s views in a way that is fair to them, rather
than rejecting them outright.

Definition of Terms
I define the radical right as the space on the political spectrum between the moderate
right—such as Angela Merkel and Mitt Romney, and the extreme right—for example, neoNazis. The extreme right believes in an openly racist state and rejects “the essence of
democracy.”4 But the radical right—the focus of this thesis— “accepts the essence of
democracy, but opposes fundamental elements of liberal democracy, most notably minority
rights, rule of law, and separation of powers.”5 For example, the radical right in Germany and
Hungary often call for popular referendums to protest immigration. According to the radical
right, majority rule should be strong enough to overrule the civil liberties of minorities. While
the extreme right is often violent, the radical right aspires to gain power by democratic means.
However, through its populism the radical right can erode the underpinnings of democracy.

4
5

Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 7.
Mudde, The Far Right Today, 7.
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To understand populism, we can contrast it against pluralism which holds that
disagreement is healthy and politicians should tolerate opposing views. The 2008 presidential
race in which Barak Obama and John McCain treated each other as political adversaries as
opposed to hated enemies is an example of pluralism. Populism, on the other hand, “considers
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure
people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the
general will of the people.”6 The radical right is populist because it holds that liberals are not
only misguided but morally corrupt. Donald Trump’s descriptions of a liberal “deep-state” or
“swamp” are populistic, as are the Hungarian radical right’s accusations that George Soros wants
to destroy Hungary’s independence for his financial gain. Populists argue that they channel a
national will which all true members of the nation endorse. Parties that disagree are illegitimate.
While populists claim to be democratic, they attack the pluralistic underpinnings of liberal
democracy, such as the independence of constitutional courts, higher education, and the media.

The Hungarian populist radical right’s main policies and actions include:
1. Expansion of government power into the media
2. Anti-separation of powers through constitutional changes
3. Anti-independence of higher education
4. Anti-immigration/Islamophobia
5. Fostering diplomatic and trade relations with authoritarian states

6

Cas Mudde, On Extremism and Democracy in Europe (New York: Routledge, 2016), 68.
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6. Promoting an ethnic understanding of Hungarian national membership through
historiography and policy.
7. Euroscepticism

7

Introduction: The Sixth Coffin
1989 was an eruption rivaled in hope and turmoil in contemporary history only by the
Arab Spring of 2011. From Tiananmen Square to the graves of the Ceaușescus in Romania, and
the crumbling Berlin Wall, communist subjects chanted for the end of dictators.
In that year, a young Viktor Orbán spoke before a crowd gathered in Budapest’s Hero’s
Square to memorialize the murder of Hungary’s most prominent dissidents and rebury their
remains. Among those to be honored was Imre Nagy, a liberal-minded communist who had been
executed by the Soviet-backed Kádár regime in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution. Though the
regime that executed him remained in power, in 1989 it was unwilling to stamp out the coming
revolution without Soviet military backing. Hungary’s prominent dissidents shifted
uncomfortably when the young and largely unknown Orbán approached the phalanx of
microphones. They were on the cusp of a revolution without violence or Soviet intervention, but
Orbán’s Fidesz party had spent the night before taunting the Soviet embassy: “Your visa has
expired! Russians go home!”7
Long-haired, Orbán wore no necktie to emphasize the party’s youth. Although there were
five dead dissidents at the ceremony, there were six coffins: the final one was symbolically
reserved for the nameless young people tyrannized by the communists after 1956. “It was in fact
then, in 1956,” Orbán declared, when our youth was taken away from us “by the Hungarian
Socialist Workers’ Party.”8 While the liberal dissidents had cooperated with the communist party
to affect a transition, Orbán mocked the aged party-men for attending the reburial of the men

“Hungary Twenty Years Ago: The Rise of Viktor Orbán,” Hungarian Spectrum, June 21, 2009.
https://hungarianspectrum.org/2009/06/21/hungary-twenty-years-ago-the-rise-of-viktor-orban/.
8
“1989 - Orbán Viktor Nagy Imre újratemetésén - Viktor Orbán's Speech at the Reburial of Imre Nagy,”
GeneralForgeron, April 24, 2020, Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g91-OTiXVkw.
7
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they had murdered: “we do not understand that those leaders of the party and the state, who have
ordered our education from the books that have falsified the revolution, are almost stampeding
each other to touch these caskets as a lucky talisman of sorts.”9 To Orbán, the smooth transition
threatened his goal for Hungary’s complete break with the old regime and repudiation of the
communist system, and he sought to enrage the crowd before the revolution’s tension subsided
completely into the work of forming a new government.

Viktor Orbán speaking in Hero’s Square 16 June 1989.10

It wasn’t until 2010 that Hungary finally experienced its “revolution at the ballot box”
when, following the left-wing government’s failure to ameliorate the effects of the 2008
Financial Crisis, Fidesz was voted into executive and legislative power with a two-thirds
supermajority.11 Hungary’s Prime Minister since 2010, Viktor Orbán ensured Fidesz’ longevity
by stacking Hungary’s constitutional court with loyalists, modifying the constitution, attacking
the independence of higher education, and using crony tactics to starve out and purchase
opposition media. In the words of political scientist Michael Ignatieff, it is one of history’s

“Viktor Orbán's Speech at the Reburial of Imre Nagy.”
http://budapestbeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/orban.png.
11
Rosa Schwartzburg and Imre Szijarto, “When Orbán was a Liberal,” Jacobin, July 24, 2017,
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/07/viktor-orban-fidesz-party-youth-activism.
9
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greatest “curveballs” that right wing authoritarianism emerged from liberal anti-communism.12
However, in hindsight perhaps we should have seen the seeds of Orbán’s authoritarianism in his
desire to manipulate the past at the end of the Cold War.
Unlike Donald Trump’s murky allusion to a time when America was “great,” the
Hungarian radical right’s construction of the past is crystal clear, prominent, and sophisticated. It
exists in museums and statues; politicians refer to specific dates and historical figures. The
government’s historiography articulates and distorts the past to serve political ends; its
presentation of the Holocaust serves its nationalist narrative in which foreign empires robbed
Hungary of its sovereignty, taking away its historical agency and threatening to destroy its
identity. Fidesz’ historiography finds support in public intellectuals, including PhD historians
such as Mária Schmidt and Sándor Szakály. Fidesz’s government spokesman, Zoltán Kovács, is
a former historian and Prime Minister Orbán has studied law, Political Science, and holds a
Master’s Degree. The misguided nature but internal coherence of the radical right demands that
we engage with its views seriously rather than dismissing them out of hand. The main goals of
my thesis are to contextualize the government’s presentation of twentieth-century Hungarian
history against academic findings and to understand how the government’s framing serves to
justify its radical-right wing positions, namely its nationalism, Euroscepticism, and
Islamophobia.
In Chapter 1, I examine the 2002 House of Terror Museum in Budapest which focuses on
the impact of Hungary’s “double-occupation” in 1944-1945 by Nazi Germany and the Red
Army. The House of Terror uses the historical authenticity of its building as a center for both

“Orban in Hungary: The Rise of Populism,” VPRO Documentary, September 21, 2018, Video,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NBvDrJQfi50.
12
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fascist and communist forces at different times to metaphorically convey their similarity. In
doing so, it served the government’s 2002 portrayal of the past in which fascism and communism
posed a twin threat to Hungary’s independence and internal unity, depriving Hungary of its
agency during the Holocaust. The House of Terror emphasizes that the communist government
indoctrinated Hungarians with the Marxist ideal that nationality and culture are impediments to
social progress. It therefore portrays Hungarians as victims of totalitarianism and
internationalism, and frames Christian nationalism as the antidote to Hungary’s twentiethcentury ills.
Chapter 2 examines two government projects during its proclaimed Holocaust Memorial
Year of 2014: a sculpture memorializing the victims of German occupation, and a new Holocaust
museum, “The House of Fates.” Right wing historians used the events to claim that Hungary had
reconciled with its Jews and, by accepting the Jews into the Hungarian national community, had
completed the “love-story” between Jews and Magyars which began with their legal
emancipation in 1867. In doing so, the radical right’s narrative overlooked the role of Hungarian
nationalism in ostracizing the Jewish community prior to the German invasion of 1944, which
was a pre-condition for the horrific scale of the Hungarian Holocaust. While claiming to extend
its welcoming hand to the contemporary Jewish community, the government neglects to confront
the underpinnings of the interwar right which fueled anti-Semitism.
Chapter 3 analyzes the government’s 2020 commemoration of the Treaty of Trianon’s
centenary, in which the victorious allies of World War I divided the Austro-Hungarian Empire
into independent nation-states and stripped the Hungarian Kingdom of much of its traditional
lands. Fidesz interprets Trianon as evidence that Western Europe viewed and continues to view
Hungary with colonial condescension as a territory whose borders and demography it has the

11

right to redraw. Naming 2020 the Year of National Unity, Fidesz leaders often described a
continuity with the Trianon past by claiming to defend Hungary from Western European
imperialism’s new manifestations: liberalism and multiculturalism. The radical right maintains
that in the face of territorial dismemberment followed by half a century of Nazi and Soviet
domination, Hungarian national unity must remain indestructible, and to that end Hungarians
must take pride in their heritage and culture. The radical right pedestalizes nationalism as the
invisible fabric which holds Hungarians together, even when they reside across borders.
Acknowledgement of collective guilt for the Holocaust is impossible because it requires Fidesz
to interrogate the historic cost of Hungarian nationalism.
This thesis studies how the radical right instrumentalizes—indeed weaponizes—
historiography in service of its nationalism. In the words of Holocaust historian Timothy Snyder,
“It is easy to sanctify policies or identities by the deaths of the victims. It is less appealing, but
more morally urgent, to understand the actions of the perpetrators. The moral danger, after all, is
never that one might become a victim but that one might be a perpetrator or bystander.”13 The
radical right frames twentieth-century perpetrators as a small cadre of villainous Nazis whose
perspectives are so unlike ours that they are only worthy of study insofar as they reveal the scale
of Hungarian trauma. It also claims that there is an inherent danger in studying collective guilt
for the Holocaust because it subverts national pride. By focusing on the moral evil of
perpetrators and the purity of victims, who it construes as almost all Hungarians, the radical right
precludes debate about the consequences of prejudice in Hungarian society today. This
historiography manifests in policy, creating real-world consequences for the thousands of
refugees fleeing to Europe from Middle Eastern conflicts.

13

Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York, Basic Books, 2010), 400.
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Chapter 1 - Terror Háza: Leftism as Terror
In 2002 Fidesz funded Terror Háza, or “The House of Terror” museum, designed by a
government ally and historian, Mária Schmidt, which documents and memorializes the
Hungarian experience of totalitarianism in the twentieth century. Its building, 60 Andrassy,
looms over the historic Andrassy Boulevard in Budapest. As the museum describes, the building
cast a shadow in the minds of Hungarians during the fascist and communist periods, notorious as
a base for the Arrow Cross in the interwar period, and eventually for the communist secret
police.14 Today, a black eave etched with cutouts casts the word “Terror,” alongside the Soviet
star and Hungarian Nazi cross onto an artificial shadow. The display preserves the building’s
historical infamy and prevents its nineteenth-century architecture—ubiquitous along Andrassy
Boulevard—from melting into its charming surroundings.15 Within the House of Terror visitors
walk through dark rooms with dramatic lighting, music, and atmospheric scenery designed to
produce a guttural response.16
The instruments on display within the House of Terror are words and propaganda posters.
The museum claims that physical violence is not the sole essence of terror, though there was
plenty of that to be had during the communist years: “I never imagined that a man of 56 could be
so severely beaten, kicked, tortured with all sorts of instruments, drugged by injections so that he

“Reconstructed Prison Cells,” House of Terror Museum, Accessed April 22, 2021,
https://www.terrorhaza.hu/en/allando-kiallitas/basement/reconstructed-prison-cells.
15
The museum’s director, Maria Schmidt, writes: “We made the building reminding us of state-perpetrated crimes
in two totalitarian regimes conspicuous in its environment by architectural means so that it become visible for all
that this had been the house of fear. We cut the symbols of both of the dictatorships and the word ˝terror˝ into the
wide cornice so that the sun cast a shadow forming these marks on the gray walls of the house. A shadow that once
darkened our everyday lives.” (https://schmidtmaria.hu/eloadasokbeszedek/v/eloadasok_the_democratization_of_kn/)
16
Amy Sodaro, Exhibiting Atrocity: Memorial Museums and the Politics of Past Violence (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 2018), 68.
14
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could be deprived of his will-power.” However, the museum devotes the most space to the
abstract terror of the twentieth century which laid siege to Hungarian identity:
Whether at work or during free time, people were required to show their belief in the
system. Before work, joint half-hour readings of the Party´s central newspaper, ‘Free
People’ were held to deepen ideological identity… The Hungarian coat of arms was also
modified. Instead of the Hungarian national anthem, people had to sing the Socialist
Internationale… Those citizens who did not show enough enthusiasm risked being
reported by the ever-present informer. Everyone learned how to whisper since they feared
being overheard or bugged. Terror overshadowed daily life.17
Violence, the museum claims, was only one mean of instilling Hungarians with terror. Against
the context of 9/11, it claims that “terror” is not only the domain of Muslim extremists, but
European politicians and bureaucrats who proclaimed the benefits of socialism.

Exterior of the House of Terror.18

“Everyday Life,” House of Terror Museum, Accessed April 22, 2021, https://www.terrorhaza.hu/en/allandokiallitas/first_floor/everyday-life.
18
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Budapest_Haus_des_Terrors.jpg.
17
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The Museum’s Political Context
When Viktor Orbán’s Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) rose to power in 1998, Hungary
was suffering economically from its transition to democratic capitalism eight years earlier. The
center-right Magyar Democratic Forum (MDF) had governed from 1990-1994 and the
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) from 1994 to 1998. József Antall, the Prime Minister of the
MDF government and his MSZP successor, Gyula Horn, were both born in 1932. By contrast,
Viktor Orbán was born in 1963. Seeing youth as symbolic of a departure from Hungary’s past,
the rural and largely working class Fidesz had once placed an age limit of thirty-five years on
party membership. In its rhetoric, although Hungarians had defeated communism in 1990,
Fidesz’s 1998 victory marked a second revolution: a new government not implicated by the
immense wealth inequality of the post-communist 1990s would lead Hungary. László Kövér, a
Fidesz parliamentarian has described the first free parliament in 1990 not as a revolution, but a
“great scam.”19
During the communist years, many Hungarians saw independence and political liberty as
the keys to a better future. However, after the fall of Hungarian communism in 1990 the state reprivatized industry, agriculture, and finance just as the post-communist world more generally
was undergoing economic depression. Many of the powerful were former regime insiders who
were well positioned in 1990 to grab state assets for themselves as they were privatized.20
Hungarians continued to feel victimized, though their victimizers were now bankers and
financial oligarchs rather than communist bureaucrats. The unemployment rate rose from zero to

“House Speaker Kövér: “This opposition is not part of the Hungarian nation but a servant to that world elite,”
Hungary Today, April 29, 2020, https://hungarytoday.hu/kover-interview-opposition-eu-third-reich/.
20
Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, The Light that Failed: Why the West is Losing the Fight for Democracy (New
York: Pegasus Books, 2019), 65.
19
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fourteen percent. With the ability to travel freely and access Western media, many Hungarians
took out loans from West European banks, many in Swiss francs, to buy new houses which
reflected Western living standards. As the Hungarian economy worsened, the Hungarian forint
lost its value worldwide and Hungarians’ loans in foreign currencies skyrocketed relative to their
own; countless Hungarians plummeted into debt.21 Under Antall’s leadership, many grew to
resent the democratic capitalism they had once heralded to solve the Eastern Bloc’s problems
and had instead brought upheaval and economic disruption.22
Fidesz campaigned by explaining Hungary’s problems in post-communism as endemic to
its incomplete transition. In a 2014 speech Orbán described those years: “We constantly felt that
the weaker were stepped upon… It was always the stronger party, the bank, which dictated how
much interest you pay on your mortgage, changing it as they liked over time.”23 As Hungarian
sociologist András Bozóki argues, in response to the short-fallings of the previous two
governments Fidesz asserted that citizens should advance the public good by acknowledging
“that the government can have a creed in moral, religious and social questions.”24 In other words,
the best way to transition from communism was not to eliminate government presence in the
economy—thus giving free license to oligarchs—but to empower a Hungarian government that
represented the authentic people and embraced Hungarian national identity. Bozóki concludes
that “This ideology was the ‘spiritual revival’ of the country… Fidesz – MPP in power not only
wanted to address first and foremost the naturally divided political community but aimed at

21

Krastev and Holmes, The Light that Failed, 65-66.
Krastev and Holmes, The Light that Failed, 65.
23
Krastev and Holmes, The Light that Failed, 65.
24
Andras Bozoki, “Consolidation or Second Revolution? The Emergence of the New Right in Hungary,” Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 24, Issue No. 2 (April 28, 2008), 197.
22
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reconstructing the cultural – moral community – according to its own values – that existed in the
imagination of Hungarians.”25
Viktor Orbán’s youth signified a new beginning for Hungary, and a future in which
Hungarian civic responsibility would neither be enforced by a communist dictatorship nor
neglected by a weak government but encouraged by young anti-elitists who were proud of
Hungary’s national and Christian identity. Fidesz built relationships with conservative and
revisionist intellectuals, such as the historian Mária Schmidt, to commemorate this Hungarian
renaissance.

Double Occupation
The House of Terror, designed by Prime Minister Orbán’s advisor, Mária Schmidt, is a
departure from the quaint history museums that many Americans are familiar with, characterized
by well-lit historical artifacts and written text within glass cases. As sociologist Amy Sodaro
points out in her book, Exhibiting Atrocity: Memorial Museums and the Politics of Past
Violence, the House of Terror is less concerned with displaying comprehensive information than
it is with creating a visceral and emotional experience through art and symbolism.26 It is less
important to give a lengthy history lesson, the museum seems to say, than it is that its experience
impact the visitor with the terror Hungarians experienced and inflicted on each other in the
twentieth century. Merely preserving the instruments of totalitarianism—uniforms, party badges,
old telephones etc.—seemed insufficient to convey the sensation of dread produced by the men

25
26

Bozoki, “Consolidation or Second Revolution?” 213.
Sodaro, Exhibiting Atrocity, 70.
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who lurked in the building’s halls. Visitors to the House of Terror are greeted with black walls,
real dungeons, and a booming soundtrack of historical political speeches.
However, when the artifacts no longer speak for themselves, there is potential for a
museum to express a director or politician’s historiography. Randolph L. Braham, a Holocaust
survivor and historian has referred to Fidesz and its intellectual supporters as “history-cleansers”
for relativizing the Holocaust to communist oppression. Indeed, the museum’s focus on the
communist years at the expense of detail on the Holocaust implicitly conveys that communist
trauma is more significant in Hungary’s historical narrative.
The permanent exhibition of the House of Terror begins with the “Wall of Double
Occupation,” which is painted black on one side and red on the other. Its design symbolizes that
Nazism and communism are two sides of the same coin. The black side of the wall displays
footage of Hitler’s rallies and images of concentration camps while the red side shows military
parades outside the Kremlin in Moscow. Both display dictators with cult-like personalities
speaking before seas of soldiers poised to invade Hungary. The exhibit also features footage of
Germany and the USSR’s foreign ministers, Molotov, and Ribbentrop, signing the 1939 nonaggression pact which included secret plans to divide Poland between them.

The Wall of Double Occupation.27

27

https://www.terrorhaza.hu/files/lead_image/image/407/7a98f3124b8c6a422c3e9fd5b205fa95.jpg.
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The museum’s choice to compare rather than contrast fascism to Soviet communism is
not uncommon in Eastern Europe where many argue that Nazism gets disproportionate attention
in Western memory. While many Americans learn of the horrors of the twentieth century from a
West European perspective, through stories such as Anne Frank, relatively few learn from school
or film about the violence the Red Army committed against East European civilians, the
deportations of hundreds of thousands to gulags, or the Soviets’ violent suppression of resistance
in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). One of the museum’s
main attractions is a Soviet tank—a symbol of anti-fascist resistance—sitting in a pool of oil
before the photographs of Hungarians the Soviets murdered in 1956, reversing the narrative that
the Red Army was Europe’s liberator.28 The museum argues that historical memory which
portrays the Red Army as heroes of the Second World War serves to whitewash the Soviet
Union’s own attempt to colonize Eastern Europe. From the Hungarian perspective on the
battlegrounds of World War II, and the site of brutal occupations by both fascist and communist
regimes, for West European liberals to intellectualize the ideologies or to take MarxismLeninism at its word misses the point of their overall similarities in totalitarianism and violence.

28

Sodaro, Exhibiting Atrocity, 70.
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Soviet Tank before wall of victims in the House of Terror.29

A quote on the wall from a Hungarian left-wing politician, Imre Kovács, reads: “Last
night I dreamt the Germans left and no one stepped in their shoes.”30 By showcasing the
Hungarian left’s distrust of Soviet communism, the museum demonstrates that Hungarians
almost universally rejected it. It then mirrors that theme in its description of the German invasion
of Hungary: “We have clearly stated the date when a foreign super-power provided the
circumstances for the creation of a totalitarian dictatorship: March 19th, 1944, the day of Nazi
occupation, the day when Hungary lost its independence.”31 Without disagreeing with the
museum’s assessment of fascism and communism, we should ask why it chooses to foreground
that comparison. By emphasizing the foreign and totalitarian nature of fascism and communism,
the museum disguises the extent to which the Hungarian government in the interwar era, and its
radical right allies, willingly cooperated with Hitler. According to this logic, because

29

https://www.terrorhaza.hu/files/lead_image/image/424/b480086e41c5c4fee392d53de56b795e.jpg.
Sodaro, Exhibiting Atrocity, 70-71.
31
“Second Floor,” House of Terror Museum, Accessed April 22, 2021, https://www.terrorhaza.hu/en/permanentexhibition/second_floor.
30
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communism and fascism are fundamentally similar—if Hungarians rejected communism, then
they must have rejected fascism as well.
Indeed, the museum claims that Hungary lost its sovereignty in spring 1944 with the
German invasion which established a “puppet government” under Prime Minister Döme Sztójay.
This description belies the fact that the Nazis allowed Hungary’s right-wing leader, Regent
Miklós Horthy, to remain in power after the invasion, and that although under German pressure,
he constitutionally appointed Hungary’s new fascist ministers. Leading a legally appointed
cabinet as a familiar ruler, Regent Miklós Horthy legitimized the far right’s subsequent
complicity in the Holocaust. As Randolph L. Braham contends: “Without the unequivocal
support of the new, constitutionally appointed government that enjoyed the blessing of Miklós
Horthy… the Nazis… would have been severely hampered if not helpless… With Horthy still at
the helm and providing the symbol of national sovereignty, the Hungarian police, gendarmerie,
and civil service collaborated with the SS in the anti-Jewish drive with a routine and efficiency
that impressed even the Germans.”32
The House of Terror also ignores Hungary’s foreign policy in the 1930s and 1940s which
led to its economic vassalage to the Third Reich. Just as Hitler’s Germany emerged from the
Great Depression with a booming economy and miniscule unemployment by gearing its
workforce towards armament, the Hungarian economy revitalized itself by manufacturing
materials for the Nazi war machine. Hungary also aligned itself with Hitler’s belligerent aims by
signing the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939 and lending its railway infrastructure for the German
invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941. Eventually, Hungary committed the 2nd Army to the ranks of

Randolph L. Braham, “Assault on Historical Memory: Hungarian Nationalists and the Holocaust,” In “Hungary
and the Holocaust: Confrontation with the Past,” (Washington DC: The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,
Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, 2001), 48.
32
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Germany’s Army Group South which invaded the Soviet Union. During this period Hungary was
indebted to Germany for its arbitration of the 2nd Vienna Award in which Romania returned
Transylvania to Hungary. The museum never asks: if the values and governance of Horthy’s
Hungary were so diametrically opposed to the Nazi totalitarian system, then why was Germany
content to allow Horthy to lead Hungary after the occupation? Why was Horthy content to lead
under the thumb of Nazi Germany without resisting?

Interwar and World War II Hungary33
Contradictions and countless what-ifs complicate
the narrative of Hungary’s international politics in the
1930s and 1940s. One such paradox is that Jews in nations
allied with Nazi Germany, like Italy, Romania, and
Bulgaria, were more likely to survive than those that
Horthy with Hitler 1938.

resisted it and fell to total occupation. Before spring of
1944, ninety-five percent of Hungary’s Jews, Hungary

being an axis power at the time, were still alive. Meanwhile over two million Jews in Poland,
which had resisted Nazi Germany, were dead.34 Randolph L. Braham has suggested that if the
Miklós Kállay administration (1942-1944) had remained a vocal ally of Nazi Germany instead of
trying to defect to the Allies, “the Jews of Hungary might possibly have survived the war
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relatively unscathed.”35 Indeed, by trying—and failing—to negotiate with the Allies behind
Hitler’s back Hungary provided Germany with the pretext to invade it. However, once Germany
controlled Hungary, the government’s complicity convinced Hitler and Eichmann that they could
carry out the Final Solution without diverting military resources from the battlefront against the
USSR. Historians are faced with a contradiction: by showing dissent to German authority,
Hungary invited its own occupation. Simultaneously, its apparent willingness to collaborate with
the occupying German forces following the invasion convinced Hitler that deporting Hungary’s
Jews to the death camps would not be a logistical debacle. So, did resistance or collaboration
cause the large scale of the Hungarian Holocaust? At different times, they both played a role.
Hungary’s contradictory foreign policy indicates the fractures between the indecisive
Horthy, his moderate ministers such as Teleki and Kállay, and the Germanophile militaristic
radical right. At varying points before March 1944 Hungarian Prime Ministers resisted German
attempts to dominate its Jewish policy and organically passed racialized anti-Semitic legislation.
Hungarian officials engaged in or supported the Germans in massacring Jews from occupied
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and, at other times, committed themselves to bringing those
military leaders responsible to justice. Horthy himself vacillated between a policy of economic
and military commitment to Germany and possible defection to the allies. To this day it is
unclear whether Horthy hoped that abandoning Germany was a feasible option to save Hungary
from destruction, or if he merely wanted to establish Hungary’s alibi to the Allies once the Third
Reich was destroyed.
Hungarian policy pre-March 1944 is a grey area in equal parts because Hungary’s leaders
made miscalculations and because, wedged in the Carpathians, Hungary was so geographically
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distanced from the allied armies. Historian István Deák asks how Hungary could have resisted
Germany effectively when “arms for resisting the Germans could only have been had from
Germany; when most of the army officers were Nazi sympathizers; and when the population
generally expected its economic betterment from Germany?”36 While this dilemma explains why
there was no armed resistance, it does not explain the lack of widespread civil disobedience that
might have hindered the Germans during the spring 1944 Jewish deportations.
Further complicating analysis of the Horthy era is that, although his leadership as regent
was uninterrupted between 1920-1944, he did not act as a dictator; he appointed Prime Ministers
and pushed for their dismissal but did not control them. Although there were elements of
authoritarianism in place during Horthy’s regency, particularly for the Jews, the communist party
was the only party that was banned and Hungarians enjoyed freedom of the press and
independence of the courts for much of the duration of World War II.37 In an act of defiance to
Nazi Germany, a Hungarian court convicted and sentenced several Hungarian army officers who
were complicit in a Jewish massacre. The perpetrators were only saved by a Nazi German rescue
operation. Furthermore, by 1944 the seventy-eight-year-old regent’s intellectual abilities were
declining.38 Deák writes that while the Horthy regime failed,
It is unlikely, however, that any other regime would have done better; some others in
Hitler’s Europe did definitely worse. It should be understood that the extent of material
and human losses suffered by European states during the war, and their postwar
treatment, depended on luck, geography, and great power politics… Miklós Horthy
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himself was neither better nor worse than most other military men who emerged as
political leaders in the interwar years. He was neither a fascist nor a liberal; he was not a
monster, but he was not a humanitarian either. He was no democrat but never tried to be a
dictator.
He concludes, “Like so many other statesmen of the period, Miklós Horthy might merit a little
sympathy, but he does not deserve admiration.”39
The Hungarian government’s openly pro-fascist foreign policy in conjunction with its
internal anti-Semitic policies (the topic of Chapter 2) eroded its ability to resist Germany’s
eliminationist goals by creating exceptions to the liberty and rule of law. “The
counterrevolutionary regime of Admiral Horthy,” István Deák concludes, “had taught the
population to discriminate against some of its fellow citizens and to take for granted the
redistribution of property on the basis of denominational membership and race. It had also taught
the population to accept gifts of land from another power in exchange for at least a partial
surrender of national sovereignty.”40 The landscape of Hungary’s interwar regime is difficult to
navigate. In its Jewish policy it was authoritarian, but it kept the nation’s media and courts free
long after most European states had restricted them. It fought alongside Germany and Italy while
never fully relinquishing hope of joining the allies. It supported Hitler while keeping its domestic
fascist movements out of the government. And it supported Nazi Germany in the hopes of
regaining territory lost from World War I. Thus, the German occupation of Hungary is far more
complicated than merely a story about its military invasion and the imposition of a system that
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Hungarians rejected entirely. These factors influenced how the government responded to the
German invasion and its reasons for cooperating with the SS.

The House of Terror on Totalitarianism and Christianity
Instead of analyzing Horthy’s foreign policy and the government’s alienation of the Jews
from civil society and the economy, the museum devotes nearly all its attention to the fringe
Hungarian fascist party: The Arrow Cross. The “Passage of the Hungarian Nazis,” features a
wall-to-wall engraving of a speech by Ferenc Szálasi, the Hungarian fascist leader, which he
gave soon after the October 16, 1944 putsch that toppled the Horthy regime and brought the
fascist Arrow Cross to power for three months.41 In the next room a uniformed mannequin, the
“ghostly figure of Ferenc Szálasi,” stands at the head of a table while Hungarian fascist and
German SS uniforms line the walls.42

Room of the Hungarian Nazis.43
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Monitors show footage of ice floating down a river, evoking the winter 1944-45 massacres in
which Hungarian fascists massacred Budapest Jews on the bank of the Danube. Although an
event worth mentioning in any museum about the Hungarian Holocaust, its placement as one of
the permanent exhibition’s first displays creates the impression that the persecution of Jews was
entirely the action of German and Hungarian Nazis. By foregrounding the Arrow Cross, the
museum argues that Hungarian Nazis, although few in number, were the primary agents of terror
in 1944-1945, even though most of the Hungarian Jews who died were killed during Horthy’s
leadership.
The museum then adds detail to its comparison between Nazism and communism: “On
the basis of collective criteria, these totalitarian dictatorships persecuted and killed those who
they ruled under their might. However, religion… approached the question of sin and
forgiveness on the basis of personal responsibility. The Nazis and the Communists replaced God
with their leaders and claimed that it was they who were omniscient and infallible.”44 With its
mention of “personal responsibility” the museum portrays a totalitarian worldview which is the
opposite of the Christian worldview. Because the House of Terror sees a high traffic of young
people and tourists—not just highly educated Hungarians—it mobilizes a visitor’s prior
knowledge about Nazism to fill in the gaps of their understanding of communism.
The museum’s framing of European fascism as universally atheistic is also inaccurate:
Ferenc Szálasi of the Arrow Cross considered himself a devoted Christian and added racial
elements to Christian anti-Semitic stereotypes that the mainstream Hungarian right already
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embraced.45 Szálasi once wrote that it was the duty of every Magyar Priest to be “the priest and
brother of every Magyar and, according to the commands of his faith, should bring his Magyar
brothers closer to God…”46 As Paul Hanebrink argues, “Like many adherents of national
socialism in Germany, Hungary's fascists easily blended Christian symbolism and visions of
blood and race.”47 Although many fascists built cults of personality around their leaders, some
even claiming to be infallible, it is too large a leap that this necessarily entailed the persecution
of the Churches. To do this is to take Hitler’s specific anti-Christian version of fascism and
project it onto East European fascist movements which had completely different views of
Christianity.
By focusing on Nazi and communist persecution of Hungary’s churches, the House of
Terror portrays Hungarian Christianity as the antithesis of foreign totalitarianism: The Nazis and
the Communists “announced that a new type of man was needed to create a new world and a
paradise on Earth, thus, they had the right to destroy anything or anyone who stood in the way of
their highest goal.”48 It adds: “The Communist dictatorship that was laid down in the footsteps of
the Soviet invaders considered churches as enemies from the very beginning and a target for
destruction due to their moral and spiritual respect in addition to financial power and
internationally organized structure.”49 It is logical that the Soviets attacked churches in Hungary
because of their wealth and because they anchored Hungarians to institutions which persisted in
democratic Western Europe. It is also true that Marxism, the state ideology of the Soviet Union,
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perceived organized religion as part of the superstructure that held up the unequal system of
industrial capitalism. The museum, however, embeds in these verifiable claims the clause that
the Soviets targeted Christian institutions because they were moral and spiritual authorities.
Rather than understanding the causal relationship between organized Hungarian Christianity, the
nationalist government, and anti-Semitism, the museum decouples religion from authoritarianism
and frames it as a rallying point of Hungarian resistance to foreign invaders.
The House of Terror expands on this theme in the Room of Churches, which displays a
blaring white crucifix on the floor symbolizing how totalitarians attempted to stamp Hungarian
Christianity into the ground. The room’s central historical artefact is the cape of Archbishop
Mindszenty who led the Hungarian Catholic Church in the immediate post-war years, having
been a vocal opponent of fascism and communism. The museum’s website describes the contrast
between these Christian relics and the ideological “hate speech” blaring from its speakers: the
room contains “Mindszenty’s cape and the relics of religious orders which have been trampled
upon [to] symbolize the war of materialism with religion, inhumanity with humanity.”50
Materialism is inhumanity and religion is humanity. This statement embodies the museum’s
thesis that we should see Hungary’s twentieth century as a conflict between foreign totalitarian
and materialistic ideologies and Hungarian Christian nationalism.
The museum acknowledges that some Hungarians willingly sided with these foreign
dictatorships by exploring Ferenc Szálasi and the Arrow Cross in detail. However, in its room of
“Changing Clothes” the museum emphasizes that in 1945, the Hungarian communist movement
was so small that it scoured Arrow Cross membership records it had captured and recruited the
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former fascists into the Communist Party.51 Thus the museum’s focus on the Arrow Cross serves
two purposes beyond merely acknowledging the existence of Hungarian Nazis: 1) It allows the
museum to exaggerate the scarcity of extremists in interwar Hungary and 2) it supports the
museum’s argument that fascism and communism are more alike than different. After all, how
different could they really be if fascists were willing to serve in the Communist Party?

Communism and the House of Terror
“Our ancestors learned that the essence of communist rule is impassioned anti-Christianity, a fierce hatred
for the nation paired with eager internationalism, artificial mass indoctrination that comes with a conscious
destruction of communities as well as the economic robbery of people concealed by deceitful philanthropic
buzzwords.”52
- Hungarian House Speaker, László Kövér

The House of Terror continues its comparison between Nazism and communism in its
room on Hungarian churches: “While the Nazis declared war based on race, the Communists
declared war based on the classes. Both, however, regarded religion as an enemy.”53 The
description’s use of “Communists” does not specify Stalinism, which the Red Army brought to
Hungary by force in 1945, the liberal communism of Imre Nagy, or the “Goulash communism”
of János Kádár in the post-1956 era. Thus, it frames East-European communism as a monolithic
and represented by 1940s Stalinism.
During the late 1940s, Stalin implemented communism at the highest executive level atop
a Hungarian Parliament and, indeed, a nation where communism held little sway. When the
communist executive nationalized Hungary’s education system, the Catholic Cardinal
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Mindszenty began to excommunicate governmental officers who cooperated with the program.54
With Hungary seemingly spinning out of control in 1948-1949, Stalin clamped down by banning
opposition parties and purging the bureaucracy of non-communists, as well as the clergy of
opposition figures, leading to several years of hardline Stalinist rule.55
The death of Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev’s ascendence to General Secretary of the
Soviet Union, which coincided with the worsening economic fallout of ham-fisted
collectivization across Eastern Europe, helped to create the conditions for Hungary’s 1956
revolution. In 1955-1956 Khrushchev publicly denounced Stalin’s oppressive style of
governance which for Hungarians only served to underscore the injustice of being led by the
Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi. To prevent a political crisis the Soviets ordered Rákosi to resign but,
rather than replacing him with the popular Imre Nagy, chose another hardliner named Ernő
Gerő.56 In October of 1956 the Soviet Union returned the popular reformer Władysław Gomułka
to power in Hungary’s neighbor, Poland. Foreseeing similar changes in Hungary, Budapest
college students gathered by the thousands on October 23, 1956 to demand leadership under the
liberal-communist Imre Nagy. They also demanded the punishment of Stalinist oppressors,
freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.57 After initial police violence, the educated and the
lower classes became unified in their outrage at the brutality of the security forces and soon
thousands of people from all social backgrounds gathered on the streets of Budapest. Nagy then
proclaimed that under his leadership, Hungary would no longer be a Soviet satellite state.58
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Although Nagy emerged merely as an anti-Stalinist, which Khrushchev was not necessarily
opposed to, he became disillusioned with the very idea that Hungary’s journey to socialism was
best served beneath the thumb of the Soviet Union.
Nagy announced that under his leadership Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw
Pact (the Soviet Bloc’s NATO) and that Hungary would become a neutral country in the Cold
War.59 On November 4 the Soviets and neighboring Warsaw Pact nations invaded Hungary and
crushed the revolution militarily. The crackdown killed roughly 2,500 Hungarians and, in 1958,
the counter-revolutionary government under János Kádár tried and executed Nagy. Through one
lens, we can see that the Hungarian Revolution was the result of a combination of the Hungarian
government’s authoritarianism and the political missteps of Khrushchev who promised deStalinization but was unwilling to upset the communist system in Hungary. When the
Hungarians fought to make the change themselves, Khrushchev saw the revolution has a blight
to the Soviets’ political prestige and as a risk to the strategic security of the Eastern Bloc.

March of Hungarian protestors, October 25, 1956.60
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In Hungarian public memory, however, 1956 is not a story about politics but another
example of Hungary’s national identity being suppressed by Russians for asserting itself. Indeed,
it was with the help of a Russian army that the Habsburg monarchy crushed the Hungarian
Revolution of 1848. Commemorating the 1956 revolution in a 2018 speech, Mária Schmidt
reminisced: “What happened to us then here in Hungary still provides hope and strength today.
Hundreds of thousands of people stood hand-in-hand on the main squares of our cities; hundreds
of thousands of total strangers hugged each other. There were those who shed tears of joy,
because the communal heartbeat of the nation was so strong that it was sensed even by those
who did not want to sense it.”61 Beyond politics, in Hungarian memory 1956 signified that in the
face of adversity, indeed a force of over two thousand Soviet tanks, they would not allow their
unique culture and identity to be swept from the map of Europe and incorporated into a Sovietcommunist empire.
Ironically, Viktor Orbán rose to fame in the 1980s by extolling the Hungarian 1956
revolutionary, Imre Nagy, who was himself a communist. Thus, the museum exemplifies a shift
in the attitudes of Fidesz and its loyalists to Hungary’s 1956 heroes. While the museum mentions
Nagy briefly in its room on “Justice” under authoritarian communism, it focuses more on the
violence and terror of the regime’s reprisals against the revolutionaries rather than the
revolutionaries’ beliefs. Indeed, the “Resistance” room makes little mention of the liberalminded communist resistance to Stalinism, but instead devotes itself largely to resistance by
military officers, such as the Community of Fellow Hungarian Fighters (MBHK) and the Colonel
Pál Hadváry group.
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Conclusion
To clarify, I am not criticizing the museum for comparing Nazism to Soviet communism,
or for giving attention to the horrific crimes that communists committed against non-Jewish
Hungarians. Double Occupation posed Hungarians with unique horrors and challenges. Timothy
Snyder wrote of the civilian experience on the Eastern Front of World War II: “A single
occupation can fracture a society for generations; double occupation is even more painful and
divisive… The departure of one foreign ruler meant nothing more than the arrival of another…
They had to deal with the consequences of their own previous commitments under one occupier
when the next one came…”62 While Snyder was describing the Western USSR in 1941, his
description can also apply to Hungary in 1944-1945. The trap of double occupation presented the
Hungarian government with a scenario in which there was no way out, only ways forward that in
hindsight may have been less horrific than the one Horthy and his ministers chose. The story of
Hungarians tyrannized under communism is worth telling.
However, by purporting to be a museum devoted broadly to the experience of “terror,”
the museum obligates itself to be comprehensive to an extent. Indeed, it describes itself as
neither a Holocaust nor Stalinism museum, but a memorial to the experience of terror in Hungary
more broadly. However, the minimal space which the House of Terror allocates to Nazi death
camps as opposed to Soviet gulags is striking. In the English translation of the text in the room of
Double Occupation, the museum devotes eighty-seven words to the spring and summer 1944
Jewish deportations. It spends an additional thirty-one words on the topic in the Passage of the
Hungarian Nazis. By contrast, the museum’s room on gulags devotes five-hundred-sixty-four
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words to the fate of Hungarians who the communists imprisoned and deported. The museum’s
room, “Resettlement and Deportation,” spends another six-hundred-fifty-six words on the
subject. This discrepancy begs the question of whether we should approach the House of Terror
as a Holocaust museum, or if in the 2002 political moment the government merely saw the
Holocaust as useful to contextualize and influence its depiction of communism.
How does the House of Terror contribute to the radical right’s framing of liberalism in
post-communist Europe? “Terror” means the same thing in English and Hungarian. Therefore,
the museum’s logo, with the title of the museum written in Hungarian, reads, “Terror Háza.”
The word “terror” also appears in the Hungarian name for the Red Terror of the short-lived
Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, “vörösterror.” So, what does “terror” mean to the museum’s
director, Mária Schmidt? In addition to using the word to describe acts of political violence by
Muslim extremists, Schmidt has described attacks on the East European right by West European
liberals as a form of “intellectual terrorism.” By this she means that “Not one segment of our
lives is being spared. Hatred bombs are being thrown at our faith, while a frontal offensive has
been launched against our system of values. Nation states and Christianity are in the
crosshairs.”63 According to Schmidt the terrorizers of the Christian world in the twenty-first
century are not only mass murderers from Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan, but leftists sheltering in
ivory towers in Brussels and Berlin.
Although Schmidt wrote this piece in 2017, fifteen years after the museum’s
inauguration, it sheds light on her conception of terrorism: it is not merely political violence. In
communist Hungary and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the government cowed
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millions into submission with the threat of exposure as a dissident, disenfranchisement, and
social alienation and ignominy. In the radical right’s ideology, the “Goulash communism” of
János Kádár and “Real existing Socialism” of Erich Honecker’s GDR terrorized the people by
indoctrinating them into believing that national identity held no spiritual bond, and therefore no
value in the international socialist utopia. They terrorized their citizens by ceaselessly repeating
that Hungarians’ unique cultures and traditions, as well as their borders were obstacles to be
overcome. According to Schmidt and Fidesz, that threat is still out there. In this way, the House
of Terror is highly political. It serves as a monument to the Fidesz regime: the first Hungarian
government since the Kingdom of Hungary under Horthy’s regency to name the spiritual unity of
ethnic Hungarians as its goal, and a pre-condition for good Hungarian government. In the
following chapter I discuss Fidesz’s Holocaust commemoration events in 2014, but first I fill in
the political history between 2002 to Fidesz’s re-election in 2010.

36

Right Wing Politics Interlude

Democratic Coalition: 9 seats
seats

Together 2014: 1 seat

133 seats

MSZP-Dialogue: 20 seats
German minority: 1 seat

Politics Can Be Different: 8

Others Independent: 1 seat

Fidesz-KDNP:

Jobbik: 26 seats64

The above image represents the distribution of the Hungarian National Assembly
between 2018-2022. With Fidesz holding two thirds of the seats and the historically extremeright Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) holding an additional twenty-six, the absence of a
center-right is striking considering that the MDF under József Antall emerged as the most
popular party in Hungary after the fall of communism.
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Throughout the 2000s Fidesz grew increasingly populistic, arguing that the left-wing
MSZP government was communist-era economic malpractice incarnate. On 17 September 2006,
a political “nuclear bomb” exploded in Hungary when internet users broadcast a secretly
recorded speech by left-wing Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány to his MSZP party members.65
The Prime Minister excoriated his bloc: “We had almost no other choice [than the package of
cuts] because we fucked up. Not just a little bit but totally... Obviously, we have been lying our
heads off for the last one-and-a-half, two years.”66 He then turned to his party’s failure to cope
with Fidesz: “I’ve only been able to keep going the last one-and-a-half years because one thing
has spurred me on: to give back to the left the belief that it could accomplish something and win!
That you don’t have to bow your head in this motherfucking country. That you don’t have to shit
yourself when you go face-to-face with Viktor Orbán and the right…”67 To this day we do not
know how the speech was leaked.
Its viral spread was catastrophic for the left. Viktor Orbán declared that “For the first time
since 1989 Hungary has become the victim of an open, organized political lie.”68 Thousands of
protestors descended on the Parliament building and Kossuth Square to protest the MSZP’s
leadership, chanting “Gyurcsány must go!”69 Viktor Orbán declared the protests a plebiscite on
the government and the opposition won overwhelmingly in the municipal elections of that fall.70
Police officers clashed violently against protestors on the symbolic day of October 23, 2006, the
fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution. Orbán successfully framed Fidesz as the
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leaders of a desperately needed opposition, a claim which would only be bolstered when the
Financial Crisis came to Europe.
What of the center right MDF? There were many factors that led to the fracturing of the
old center right. Perhaps the most important reasons were its failure to regain power from the left
in the 2000s and the increasing faith of center-right Parliamentarians that the more radical Fidesz
held the answer to the left’s electoral strength. Indeed, in the 2000s Fidesz had yet to embrace
Islamophobia and authoritarianism, and instead juxtaposed its relatively clean record against the
allegations of cronyism and corruption that haunted the MSZP. In a speech from that era, Orbán
declared his intention to form a “central political forcefield” that would advance conservative
policies while safely locking the left out of government.71 In short, the center right did not
disappear or get voted out of existence. Rather, it pooled its resources together under Fidesz and
has radicalized within it.
In 2021 Fidesz holds two thirds (133) of Hungary’s 199 Parliamentary seats. Its greatest
rival is Jobbik (26 seats), followed by the MSZP (20 seats), the Democratic Coalition, a
breakaway left-wing party founded by former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (9 seats), and
Politics Can be Different, Hungary’s green party (8 seats). Because the opposition parties are
polarized on the left and right it is difficult for them to cooperate. The opposition continues to
lack a center right party because Fidesz has thus far been successful in marketing itself as radical
and conservative simultaneously, thereby monopolizing a wide breadth of the political spectrum.
Indeed, while Fidesz’s radicalism generates the most headlines internationally, much of its
legislation is essentially conservative.
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Chapter 2 – The Hungarian Holocaust: Forgetting by Remembering?
In 2014 the Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Center received a package from a man the
government likely despised. It contained the Medium Cross of the Order of the Republic of
Hungary, the nation’s highest honor, and a letter requesting that the name Randolph L. Braham,
be stricken from its Library and Information Center. The letter was signed: “Randolph L.
Braham Graduate Center of the City University of New York.”72
Professor Braham was a Hungarian Jew and survivor of the Jewish Labor Service
Battalions on the Eastern Front of World War II. After the war he moved to the U.S where he
published his 1981 history of the Hungarian Holocaust: The Politics of Genocide. Braham’s
piece on the Labor Service System is one of the most horrific. Braham points out that the
blueprint for the Jewish battalions and their legal justification dates to Admiral Horthy’s seizure
of Budapest in 1920 and the subsequent White Terror against Hungarian communists and Jews.73
After the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, Hungarian-Jewish laborers conscripted into the
system chipped out fortifications in the frozen Ukrainian soil. In the spring they tugged horsecarts through mud and cleared mine fields.74 The contemporary right’s historical narrative holds
the Horthy regency and its policies far apart from the Holocaust. Today, a recreation of the
Horthy-era Monument to the Victims of the Red Terror stands in Budapest, despite the role of
Red Terror mythology in fomenting the subsequent White Terror in which nationalist forces
purged Hungarian Jews and leftists.
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Retelling the story of the Holocaust in Hungary is important because after 1945 the
nation had no time to come to terms with it; Soviet and Hungarian communists instead banished
the Holocaust to the “Orwellian black hole of history.”75 In the Soviet narrative, the Nazis had
not invaded Eastern Europe to eliminate Europe’s Jews but to destroy the socialist worker’s
utopia. In this narrative, the primary victims were not Jews but Soviet and Hungarian communist
martyrs. In 2014 Professor Braham’s fight for recognition of the Hungarian Holocaust seemed to
have triumphed when Fidesz announced a year of Holocaust remembrance on the seventieth
anniversary of the German occupation of Hungary. After reading the government’s plan
Professor Braham returned his Medium Cross in protest. The historians behind the year’s events
framed it as a conclusion of a centuries-old story of the Hungarian struggle against outside forces
to accept Hungarian Jews into the Hungarian national community. The resounding emotions
would be loss, but also acceptance and conclusion as Hungarians supposedly triumphed over the
divisiveness of Nazism and completed Hungary’s nationalistic arc in its demonstration of
solidarity between Hungarian Jews and Christians.
While this final element seems unobjectionable, it shifts blame for the Holocaust entirely
onto Nazism and precludes discussion about the role of mainstream Hungarian nationalism in the
Hungarian Holocaust. Paradoxically, insomuch as governments invest in museums and
monuments to preserve memory, their existence risks lulling a nation into believing that its
memory work is complete.
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The Holocaust Memorial Year of 2014
In 2014, the seventieth anniversary of the Hungarian Holocaust, the government
announced a monument to “The Victims of German Occupation” and a new museum called “The
House of Fates.” The Monument to the Victims of German Occupation, which stands in
Budapest’s Liberty Square, has generated criticism for transferring blame for the Holocaust
entirely onto the German occupiers and, in the spirit of national unity and reconciliation, not
distinguishing between Jewish and Christian Hungarians who died following the occupation. The
sculpture depicts a raptor with a band around one claw reading 1944, swooping menacingly
towards the archangel Gabriel who clings to the crown of St. Stephen, a symbol of Hungarian
national sovereignty. The statue illustrates that Hungary lost its sovereignty entirely in 1944
because the German eagle pried it from its grasp. By depicting the archangel Gabriel rather than
a Jewish symbol the memorial casts the German occupation as a Hungarian national tragedy,
rather than a Jewish tragedy. A counter monument sits across from it which specifically
memorializes Hungary’s murdered Jews. Fidesz had announced the second event in 2013, a
museum directed by Mária Schmidt titled the “House of Fates.” Unlike the House of Terror, the
House of Fates was to be entirely devoted to Holocaust history and would focus on the stories of
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Jewish children deported by rail to Auschwitz.

Monument to the Victims of German Occupation in Budapest’s Liberty Square. 76

Why did Fidesz so suddenly foreground the Holocaust in Hungary’s historical narrative,
and thereby call attention to one of the most controversial and seemingly damning periods in its
history? There are two currents in Hungarian politics that may be related. The first is its use as a
mechanism for its “anti-anti-Semitism.” By expressing support for the Jewish community
through Holocaust remembrance, the government could openly condemn anti-Semitism while
appropriating anti-Semitic stereotypes to frame its politics. As Ivan Kalmar points out, “One of
the aspects of anti-anti-Semitism is that it may reverse ‘the dictums of anti-Semitism without
problematizing’ its underpinnings, and ‘thereby end up duplicating aspects of the problem that
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anti-anti-Semites seek to resist.”77 In response to any accusations of anti-Semitism the
government could point to its multitude of museums and memorials which educate people about
the Holocaust as evidence otherwise. Simultaneously, government backed newspapers and
advertising agencies could plaster the walls of public transportation with a grinning George
Soros conspiring Hungary’s demise.
For the Hungarian radical right, George Soros cuts a similar figure to the American
right’s portrayal of Hillary Clinton during Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign as a
member of “the swamp.” Just as the American right attacked Clinton as a member of the coastal
and urban elite, which is cosmopolitan and sacrifices the wellbeing of authentic Americans to
overseas interests, Fidesz accuses George Soros of planning to tear down Europe’s borders by
undermining national solidarity and flooding the continent with Muslim migrants. Orbán has
termed this conspiracy the “Soros Plan.”78 According to Mária Schmidt, George Soros will use
the liberal elites’ delusions of an open-borders utopia to expand his “philanthropic” media
empire. Once Soros controls the politicians, intellectuals, and media in a country, so the
argument goes, he will be free to exploit the country’s financial resources.79 Until 2014 Fidesz
could have denied charges of anti-Semitism by pointing to the government’s highest award
sitting in Professor Braham’s office.
Another reason for the government’s focus on the Holocaust is, as Mónika Kovács
describes, “The Holocaust became a global icon and a symbol of radical evil and recognizing it
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as such appeared to Central European societies as a moral obligation and a condition for
accession to Europe. Either freely or due to Western pressure, they realized that ‘if a nation
actively participates in the community of Holocaust remembrance, its moral standing will
improve at the international level.”80 Memorializing the Holocaust demonstrates that a nation has
come to terms with its past by no longer downplaying its scale or significance. However, by
framing the Hungarian Holocaust as entirely the work of German Nazis, beyond influence by
Hungarians themselves—in a word, fated—the radical right can claim to cleanse the national
conscience of collective guilt and reassure people that its nationalistic policies in the twenty-first
century in no way reflect interwar policies which influenced the Holocaust.
Before analyzing the nationalist narrative in-depth, it is necessary to explain the
chronology of the Hungarian Holocaust and the pre-conditions for its brutality that Hungarians
laid down before the German occupation of 1944. By detailing Hungarian anti-Semitism before
1944, and the role it played in isolating Hungarian Jews, we can analyze how the radical right’s
near-exclusive focus on 1944 neglects some of the most important causal elements of the story.

Historical Context81
The radical right’s historiography fails to interrogate why Hungary was different from
other fascist or occupied nations that succeeded in protecting significant numbers of their Jews
such as Italy, Denmark, and Bulgaria. In part, the answer lies in the politics of the Second World
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War: in Hungary, the Nazis did not fear igniting rebellion because for much of the spring of 1944
the Jewish deportations occurred under the auspices of the constitutional Hungarian government.
While the Wehrmacht invaded Hungary in force, Adolf Eichmann arrived in Hungary with no
more than three hundred German authorities to transport over 400,000 Jews to Auschwitz.82
Edmund Veesenmayer, the SS-Brigadeführer who oversaw occupied Hungary wrote that
Hungarian authorities carried out the deportations in a praiseworthy fashion.83 According to
András Kovács, the Nazis carried out the deportations with the assistance of around 200,000
members of the Hungarian government: “In addition to the gendarmerie, the required
collaborators included a wide range of state employees from the staff of county orphan agencies
to female body-friskers.”84
The radical right’s historiography alleviates responsibility for the Holocaust from the
shoulders of ordinary Hungarians and the Christian-nationalist leaders of the Horthy regency.
While it is debatable that Horthy knew for certain before summer of 1944 that the Nazis were
sending his citizens to gas chambers, the fact remains that Hitler had expressed his eliminationist
anti-Semitism in the past to Horthy.85 In 1941, Hungarian troops annexed Carpathian Ruthenia
from former Czechoslovakia and deported its Jews to Soviet Ukraine, directly into the path of
German Army Group South and the Einsatzgruppen. Hungarians witnessed the Germans
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massacre 18,000 of these Jews in Kaminets Podolsk. If Horthy remained ignorant in 1944 it was
willfully.86
The story of the Hungarian Holocaust begins, at the latest, with the end of World War I.
The democratic government of the Aster Revolution, which had overthrown the Habsburgs in
1918, had fallen to a communist coup in March of 1919. Besieged by a Romanian army and the
counter-revolutionary Hungarian White Army, the new Hungarian Soviet Republic collapsed in
August of that same year, leaving control of a now truncated Hungary to an un-sturdy coalition
of conservative aristocratic politicians and radical rightists. Amidst the chaos of civil war, the
counter revolutionaries unleashed the White Terror which targeted and murdered Jews for their
alleged support of communism. The new government decided against instating the former
Habsburg monarch, Charles I, leaving Horthy as the de-facto head of state. Many of the policies
of Hungary’s conservative Prime-Ministers who ruled under the regency of Admiral Miklós
Horthy, a conservative aristocrat, can be seen through the lens of its tension with the radical
right.
The conservatives’ political promise was to restore Hungary to normalcy through a
functioning government and rule of law. This promise included the legal protection of Jews
(indeed in Germany, a problem for Hitler was that thuggish anti-Semitism appeared to
undermine the orderly Nazi state). However, for many Hungarians any return to normalcy
required that Hungary recapture the territory the Entente had taken from it after World War I,
through military force if necessary. The militarist radical right staked its claim to this goal and in
doing so undercut the conservative aristocratic right. While Horthy and his conservative Prime
Minister, Count István Bethlen, could not retrieve Transylvania in the 1920s, they could appease
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the militarist right by discriminating against Hungary’s Jews. In 1920 Hungary passed the
Numerus Clausus law which limited Jewish participation in higher education to six percent. The
law stemmed from the common perception that Hungary’s Jews had infiltrated its intelligentsia
and bourgeois, taking positions that should be held by Hungarians. The date of 1920 is key
because it contradicts the notion that Hungarian anti-Semitism relied on Adolf Hitler. In 1920,
Germany was a democracy and Hitler was largely unknown; he would not become the German
chancellor until 1933. Horthy once wrote a letter to Hitler boasting that anti-Semitism ranked as
an official state policy and that Hitler should not presume to lecture Hungarians about how to
solve the Jewish problem.87
The radical right also applied pressure on the government to revise the Treaty of Trianon.
In addition to breaking up imperial holdings in Eastern Europe, France had hoped to empower
Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia as buffers against the encroaching Soviet Union, at
the expense of Hungarian territory. However, the Hungarian radical right was convinced that
Trianon reflected the work of a foreign Judeo-Bolshevik spirit, and that only through its
extirpation from Hungarian political, economic, and intellectual life could Hungary regain its
former status as a regional power. To appease the radical right, the Hungarian state approved
restrictions of Jewish participation in finance, the intelligentsia, and skilled professions. Between
1932 and 1942 Regent Horthy appointed four different radical right and openly anti-Semitic
Prime Ministers: Gyula Gömbös (1932-1936), Kálmán Darányi (1936-1938), Béla Imrédy
(1938-1939), and László Bárdossy (1941-1942). These leaders pursued increasingly pro-German
foreign policy, exporting raw materials to the Nazi war-machine, and eventually committing the
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Hungarian Second Army to fight alongside Germany on the Eastern Front. In Ukraine,
Hungarian soldiers witnessed firsthand the Germans’ attempted genocide of Jews and Slavs.
In partaking of Hitler’s spoils—by 1941 Hungary occupied Transylvania and portions of
Yugoslavia—Hungary ingratiated itself to Nazi Germany while making itself economically
dependent. Long before Germany invaded it in 1944, Hungary had begun to cede its
independence piecemeal. With a closer relationship to Nazi Germany came greater pressure to
conform to Hitler’s violent anti-Semitism. In his book, The Jews in Hungary, Gyula Gömbös
claimed “The thesis is simple: the Jews must not be allowed to succeed in any field beyond the
level of their ratio in the population.”88 In 1934, now Hungary’s Prime Minister, Gömbös signed
the German-Hungarian Economic Agreement, in which Hungary exported grain, livestock, and
most of its bauxite in return for German imports of industrial goods and raw materials.89 Despite
this worrying erosion of independence, many Hungarians supported the partnership because the
jolt to industrial production increased employment.90 While German agents made inroads into
institutions such as the Hungarian gendarmerie and General Staff under the smokescreen of
economic cooperation, Gömbös himself increased government funding of anti-Semitic
newspapers.91
In 1938, Prime Minister Darányi announced his support for a popular memorandum
backed by Germanophile officers and right-wingers in the civilian government, Béla Imrédy
among them, that described the Jewish “problem” as a dire threat to Hungary’s pro-Nazi
armament. On March 5 Darányi announced the Győr plan before the nation: “The planned and
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legal solution of the [Jewish] question is the basic condition for the establishment of a just
situation—a just situation that will either correct or eliminate the aforementioned social
disproportions and will diminish Jewry’s influence in the nation’s cultural life and other fields to
its proper level.”92 On May 28 Darányi and Imrédy pushed their anti-Semitic law through
Parliament which introduced a limit of twenty percent Jewish participation in financial and
industrial enterprises.93 Although Hungarian liberals publicly protested the legislation, their
voices were overruled when Hungary’s Christian leaders, including Bishop Sándor Raffay of the
Lutheran Church and Bishop László Ravasz of the Calvinist Church favored the bill, arguing that
it would quell frustration about Jewish overrepresentation.94 Hungary’s second broad antiSemitic bill was adopted on May 4, 1939, which defined Jewishness on racial grounds by
documenting family history. The laws prohibited Jews from holding any government positions
and from working as teachers or editors in periodicals, and it planned to withdraw licenses from
Jewish businesses until they drastically lowered the number of Jews they employed.95
The anti-Semitic laws solidified and popularized the right’s view that Jews were not
Hungarians of a different faith, but a different racial community altogether: that they were
imposters who had lived amongst Hungarians all while supporting the Bolsheviks and conspiring
to control Hungary in secret. The imperative that the laws placed on carving Jews out of
Hungarian society reveals the extent of their prior assimilation—Hungarian Jews were
Hungarians, and it took decades of government legislation, and the tolerance of radical-right
prejudice by the conservative establishment to isolate and pauperize the Jewish community. For
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the Jews to appear separate from the Hungarian Christian community in 1944 was a precondition for the speed and ferocity of the Hungarian Holocaust.
Within three weeks of the German invasion of Hungary in March 1944, Interior Minister
László Endre, under Prime Minister Döme Sztójay, began preparing to ghettoize the Hungarian
Jewish community of the now heavily bombed Budapest. It ordered the municipal office to take
inventory of Jewish residences and published its findings in the anti-Semitic press, emphasizing
that the Jews who constituted twenty percent of the population occupied 47,978 rooms while the
rest of the population occupied only 70,197 rooms.96 The German Nazi Otto Winkelman testified
at the post-war trial of the Hungarian collaborators, Endre, Jaross, and Baky, that Germany was
unlikely to have carried out its anti-Semitic policy in Hungary if the Hungarian government had
opposed it. While certainly a questionable source, Winkelman explained it with the German
strategic imperative on the Eastern Front of maintaining Hungarian cooperation.97
Although Budapest’s Jewish community was spared in the summer of 1944 by Regent
Horthy, Hungary’s rural Jews were largely annihilated: roughly eighty percent of the 434,351
Jews led onto train cars by Hungarian gendarmes to Auschwitz died between May 15 and July 8,
1944.98 In Germany, historian Karl Schleunes wrote of a “Twisted Road to Auschwitz,”
cautioning against using the eventual “Final Solution” to assume that the Holocaust’s
perpetrators had possessed a “master plan” from the beginning.99 Similarly, in Hungary scholars
have debated whether one can draw a straight line of intention from the first anti-Jewish laws in
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1920 to the genocide of 1944. One consensus is that, though the line is not straight, it is still
there. While some scholars downplay the significance of the Numerus Clausus, pointing out that
its limitations on Jewish freedom were mild, Mária Kovács explains that it elevated the Jewish
Question—a mere conspiracy theory until 1920—to the plain of government recognition and
action.100 She then responds to the notion that Hungary’s renewed anti-Semitic policy in 1938
reflected only German pressure by quoting Pál Teleki, a Prime Minister most famous for
resisting Germany’s attempts to dominate Hungary. Speaking before the Upper House of
Parliament in 1928—five years before Hitler rose to power in Germany—Teleki declared, “We
must see sincerely and clearly… that… we are in the midst of a war of races… Full equality [for
the Jews] would create an impossible situation.”101
In Hungarian Holocaust survivor Imre Kertész’ novel, Fatelessness, Hungarian Jews
awaiting deportation to Auschwitz took orders not from a Nazi barking out commands, but an
amiable and slightly anxious policeman. As the day wore on and the policeman awaited
instructions, “He urged us to make ourselves comfortable. He even asked if we knew any party
games… For a while he swapped jokes with us, though meanwhile I had the feeling that he was
striving at all costs to keep us amused somehow.”102 While Kertsz’ policeman likely did not see
himself as a murderer, he participated in genocide. As Hannah Arendt reminds us in her book,
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, we should not mistake a lack of
individual malice for the absence of evil. A journalist at the Adolf Eichmann trial, Arendt was
troubled by Eichmann’s psychological normality and lack of personal prejudice against Jews, for
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he had done more than nearly anyone to organize the Final Solution.103 The horrifyingly ordinary
figure of Eichmann caused her to question whether one must be insane or hold hateful ideas to
participate in evil. In Israeli author Amos Elon’s words, Arendt “insisted that only good had any
depth. Good can be radical; evil can only be extreme, for it possesses neither depth nor any
demonic dimension… Evil comes from a failure to think.”104 Studying Hungarian guilt in the
Holocaust does not require ascribing personal blame, but it does require that we study the preconditions that allowed hundreds of thousands of Hungarians to fail to understand or grapple
with their role in mass murder.
What I have laid out is far from a comprehensive chronology of the Hungarian
Holocaust. In addition to numerous examples of Hungarian heroism in the face of the Nazi
occupation, it has left out the history of reluctance of Hungarian conservatives to be pulled too
deeply into Axis allegiance. For example, in the 1930s Hungarian courts defied Hitler by
convicting as war criminals several Hungarian officers complicit in Jewish massacres. And in
1941 Prime Minister Pál Teleki, quoted as an anti-Semite two paragraphs ago, committed
suicide, presumably after he saw his policy of non-intervention overruled when Hungary allowed
Germany to use Hungarian railways to invade Yugoslavia. My point is not to condemn all
Hungarians as guilty or to claim that nothing is morally salvageable from the 1930s, but to
emphasize that a useful explanation of the Hungarian Holocaust must begin before 1944, lest one
is to believe the government’s skewed perspective that Hungarian Christian nationalism was
blameless and honorable.
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The Long Nineteenth Century
At the center of many of these debates is Hungary’s conservative regent, Miklós Horthy.
A common factor through Hungary’s interwar and World War II history, Horthy’s name has
become a shorthand for the “respectable” interwar conservative right. Through the legacy of
Horthy, we can glean some insight into why Orbán’s government is reluctant to let go of
interwar Hungary as a proud period.
The admiral-turned-regent Miklós Horthy is a moral grey area in Hungarian history, not
unlike Paul von Hindenburg in Germany. Although not Nazis themselves, both leaders
demonstrated extreme right-wing sympathies; Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Chancellor and
Horthy appointed the anti-Semitic Gyula Gömbös as Prime Minister. Although there is little
evidence that Horthy desired the genocide of Europe’s Jews as Hitler envisioned, historians have
suggested that his actions contributed to the Hungarian Holocaust. Horthy and Hindenburg are
significant because they bridged the gap of two historical eras. Many remember the German
nineteenth century proudly as the era of Prussian triumphalism and nearly pan-German
unification under Bismarck. However, within decades this golden era was supplanted by the rise
of Nazism.
Similarly, Hungarians remember the nineteenth century by commemorating Kossuth, the
hero of the 1848 Revolution against the Austrians, which was crushed only with the help of a
Russian army. Revolutionaries such as Kossuth represent to Hungarians the resilience of
Hungarian liberal nationalism under the yoke of Habsburg rule. Hungarians also commemorate
the 1867 legal emancipation of the Jews which granted them equal rights. The figure of Miklós
Horthy, a World War I admiral and aged aristocrat by the interwar period, stands with a foot in
both worlds. He simultaneously represents the proud liberal nationalism of the pre-World War I
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years and the crumbling interwar aristocracy which, motivated by political expediency and its
own anti-Semitism, aided Hitler in the mass murder of Hungarian citizens. By lionizing Horthy,
Fidesz has capitalized on the myth of Hungary’s golden century and pushed its boundary to the
spring of 1944.

The Hungarian Holocaust in the 1990s and Beyond
Honoring Horthy is neither new in Hungary nor exclusive to the extreme right. In 2017
for instance Viktor Orbán drew criticism from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
for referring to Horthy as a “statesman.” This was not a radical claim, however, within Hungary.
After World War II Horthy lived in Portugal until his death in 1957, where he was buried. In
September 1993, the center right Antall government ceremonially reburied the regent’s body in
his Hungarian hometown, Kenderes. Several Hungarian cabinet members and tens of thousands
of spectators witnessed the ceremony, welcoming the regent back into the canon of Hungarian
history after the communists had exiled his person and his legacy.105
The event sparked protests and was accompanied by several other moves by the
government to place a lid on crimes of the Horthy era. In 1994 Hungary’s Constitutional Court
reversed the convictions of several Hungarian war criminals and Nazi-collaborators who had
been convicted under the post-war People’s Tribunal Act. The court ruled that these
collaborators were not punishable for their actions, which included ghettoization, expropriation,
and deportation, because they were not illegal at the time of their commission.106 For
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comparison, this is the argument that prosecutors at the post-war Nuremberg trials nullified by
accusing Nazis of universal crimes against humanity. Throughout the 1990s Hungarian courts
passed data protection laws making it difficult for historians to access many archival materials
from the interwar period which might have incriminated Nazi-collaborators.107 Professor Braham
also points out that the Hungarian government’s pre-occupation with unearthing the crimes of
communism caused it to be neglectful of surviving Jewish families whose property the
Hungarian government had stolen in 1944. In 1998 Viktor Orbán’s attention on the issue
amounted to an offer to pay 150 dollars to Jewish families for each family member who was a
victim of the Holocaust, presuming they could prove it.108
Hungary never experienced a 1968 moment like in Germany where college aged youths,
the first generation to be born after the Second World War, pulled back the collective amnesia
around The Holocaust. Hungary spent 1968 firmly within the Soviet bloc and following a statesupported narrative that communists had been the victims and martyrs of World War II, and that
the racial anti-Semitism of fascism was less significant than its function as an imperialist deaththroe against socialism. In the 1990s, Hungarian public memory was pre-occupied with trying to
define a new post-communist identity that also exposed the psychological scars of living under
communism.
This is not to say that the Holocaust was ignored completely—far from it. The first Orbán
regime contributed to an exhibit at the Auschwitz museum and the 1990s and the 2000s saw the
construction of two major Holocaust memorials in Budapest: The Tree of Life Memorial and the
Shoes on the Danube. In 2004 the left-wing government commissioned the Holocaust Memorial
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Center in Budapest which contains an archive and research center within a renovated Synagogue.
However, the publicity and volume of visitors to these sites pales in comparison to the House of
Terror which saw one thousand visitors per day before Covid-19. Although a robust academic
Holocaust historiography has persisted in Hungary since the late Cold War era, Hungary’s
reckoning with the Holocaust on the scale of government commemoration is just getting started.
The events of 2014 were intended to elevate Hungary’s Holocaust historiography to the same
level of attention as the House of Terror.

The House of Fates
“The identification with the victim affirms a radical separation from the perpetrator. The Treblinka guard
who starts the engine or the NKVD officer who pulls the trigger is not me, he is the person who kills someone like
myself. Yet it is unclear whether this identification with the victim brings much knowledge…”109
– Timothy Snyder.

The façade of the House of Fates is sleek and modern, constructed from concrete and
glass.110 A giant silver star of David perches in midair, suspended by two towers. Inside, the
museum is nearly vacant save for some benches and tables coated in saran wrap.111
Since 2014 the House of Fates has not seen a single visitor. So long as Mária Schmidt
directs the project, MAZSIHISZ (the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities) will not
endorse it. Without the support of Hungary’s Jews or the international Holocaust museum
community the government has hesitated to complete the project. Although the building’s shell is
now a time capsule to 2014, Mária Schmidt had planned for it to be a museum of the future. The
House of Fates was to incorporate visual and interactive storytelling through iPads, cinematic
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displays, and personalized journeys through the museum’s artefacts and historical actors.
Schmidt designed the House of Fates to induct a new generation, fourteen to twenty-four-yearolds, into the field of Holocaust History.112 Why have so many turned against the project?

Exterior of the House of Fates.113

One reason is that Schmidt’s support for the controversial Memorial to the Victims of German
Occupation demonstrated that she had not abandoned Double Genocide historiography which
refuses to differentiate between the Holocaust and Christian suffering under communism. Mária
Schmidt has even criticized the Hungarian Jewish community for monopolizing memory of
historical suffering: [The descendants of Holocaust victims] “still want to tell us who we can
grieve for and who we cannot, and who we can shed a tear for and who we cannot. They demand
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empathy from us every single day of the year while they are closing their hearts and remain blind
and deaf to others’ misery.”114
Unlike the House of Terror, the House of Fates is exclusively a Holocaust museum. With
its chosen premise being an Auschwitz-bound railway line in 1944, it places its narrative firmly
before the Soviet occupation. Schmidt planned for the museum to foreground several heroic
figures: Raoul Wallenberg, Hannah Szenes, Margit Slachta, and Sára Salkaház. While all these
stories are worth telling, by focusing almost exclusively on the Holocaust’s innocent victims and
heroes The House of Fates shines its spotlight on a minority while failing to reckon with the
passivity of the vast majority of Hungarians during the Holocaust. With its “wall of perpetrators”
it directs blame for the Holocaust to a relatively small cadre of Nazis and Quislings which it
holds apart from the otherwise pure-intentioned Hungarian population. As Mónika Kovács
argues of global Holocaust remembrance in the twenty-first century, “The moral security of
standing with the victim (‘standing on the good side’) leaves no urge for understanding the
motives of perpetrators and bystanders.”115
While a memorial preserves memory of an event and its surrounding emotions across
generations and is the interpretation of a politician, artist, or organization, a museum should seek
to educate visitors, using artifacts as its tools. Through both the House of Terror and the House
of Fates, Schmidt has blended the two methods of memory together. Indeed, what makes the
House of Terror so troubling is how it uses the building of 60 Andrassy—which was occupied by
both Nazis and communists—to tell a story with a political slant. The House of Fates is similar in
that it distorts our perception of the past not by falsifying information but through its selection of
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stories. Mária Schmidt hoped the museum would “make a contribution to reconciliation, to a
discussion of the tragedies of the past to settle issues and to at least alleviate, if not bring to an
end, all of the evil and purposeless accusations constantly experienced even today.” Thereby, she
would be “neutralizing or at least weakening the forces continuously calling Hungary an antiSemitic and fascist country, using these unfounded stigmata as a political weapon to discredit the
Hungarian nation as a whole.”116 Without explicitly denying the existence of Hungarian
collaboration in the Holocaust on a large scale, by foregrounding stories of innocent actors and
heroes the radical right directs the conversation away from the culpability of historic Hungarian
nationalism.

Conclusion
“To the extent that we encourage monuments to do our memory-work for us, we become that much more
forgetful. In effect, the initial impulse to memorialize events like the Holocaust may actually spring from an opposite
and equal desire to forget them.”117
- James Young
“In our view, the fact that we are allowed to display this part of the past in a museum can feed our hope
that we have overcome this past, and that it does not affect our lives today anymore.”118
- Mária Schmidt.

One of the most troubling themes in Schmidt’s historiography is the claim that under the
Orbán administration the Jewish and Christian populations have reconciled. Although an
admirable goal, it is disingenuous to proclaim its completion when the government refuses to
acknowledge the extent to which the Christian population at large benefited from anti-Semitism.
For thousands of Christian Hungarians who were admitted to a university in the interwar era
there were Jews who had been denied entry by law. For so many Hungarian families given
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shelter after a bombing raid in 1944 there was a Jewish family evicted to a ghetto. The frequent
criticism the Orbán administration draws from Yad Vashem, the USHMM and MAZSIHISZ
casts further doubt on its so-called reconciliation. Nevertheless, Mária Schmidt has referred to
Hungary’s relationship with its Jews as a “love story.”119 To the Hungarian radical right the
process of atoning for the Holocaust is complete: “We are at a point where some groups would
like to consider their ancestors’ tragic fate an inheritable and advantageous privilege. They
would like this ‘victim status’ to bleed to generations of those who suffered no harm.”120
James Young, an expert on Holocaust memorials, has outlined the dangers of so-called
atonement and reconciliation. In contrast to The House of Fates or Memorial to the Victims of
German Occupation, Young describes a memorial proposed by Horst Hoheisel in 1995 to destroy
the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. Instead of building a new monument, the empty space where the
Gate once stood would symbolize Germany’s absent Jewish community.121 James Young
suggests that Hoheisel knew the memorial committee would reject his design and that this
rejection was itself a part of the art piece: “Here he seemed to suggest that the surest engagement
with Holocaust memory in Germany may actually lie in its perpetual irresolution, that only an
unfinished memorial process, can guarantee the life of memory.”122 A complete memorial can
symbolize that a people has placed a cap on an event; it puts people’s consciences at ease
because the event is no longer current, but history, and because the monument preserves the
history people are free to forget it in their everyday lives. Oblivion in the place of a monument
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symbolizes that the Holocaust cannot be undone and requires a nation’s active attention to keep
the memory alive.
Hoheisel’s design was too radical and esoteric to be put into practice, and we should not
expect governments to subscribe to his vision. However, there are several Holocaust memorials
in Germany which adhere to a similar philosophy, such as the Grunewald Station “Memorial to
the Jews Deported from Berlin,” which displays several human-like silhouettes carved into a
wall in negative space.123 The popularity of this style of memorial helps to contrast the interests
behind the House of Fates and the Memorial to the Victims of German Occupation.

Grunewald Station Holocaust Memorial.124
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Chapter 3 – Immigration and National Survival: The Radical Right’s Historiography of Trianon
“Today there is no Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or Soviet Union. There is no British or French Empire.
And what’s left of them is now twisting in the multicultural grip of their vindictive colonies… Even the greatest
cannot avoid the justice of history.”125
- Viktor Orbán.

Sirens flashed in the darkness illuminating the faces of hundreds of Syrian refugees,
many carrying children, as they corralled themselves along a highway shoulder. Stranded in
Budapest by the Hungarian government, they had elected to walk to the Austrian border on foot
in a caravan which kept them within the protective view of the public and media. But as the
busses sent by the Hungarian government slowed alongside them, they feared they would be
taken not west but to detainment camp. A voice lamented, “I swear to God if they take us to a
camp, or treat us badly again… Where is the guarantee? Where is the UN? Don’t trust them
now.”126
Although the Hungarian government frames Syrians as invaders who intend to settle
Hungary, most only want to pass through it on their way west. Since the Syrian refugee crisis
began in 2015, fewer refugees have settled in Hungary and Poland than nearly anywhere else in
the European Union. Yet Hungary has militarized the migration issue: its fence along the Serbian
border is electrified and armed with cameras and heat sensors.127 In May 2020 an EU court
ordered Hungary to take down its so-called “transit zones,” which were cages where the
government detained refugees illegally.128
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Immigration and the Radical Right’s Historical Narrative
Hungary has framed its immigration policy as a reaction to the so-called disaster of
German Wilkommenskultur (Welcome Culture). In 2015 news footage displayed thousands of
German volunteers gathering outside train stations to distribute water and fresh clothes to Syrian
refugees. Conscious of the Nazi past, and that the eyes of the world were upon them, Germans
demonstrated their willingness to become a multi-ethnic society. Meanwhile the Hungarian
radical right warned that in the coming decades mass immigration would erode the cultural
integrity of welcoming nations. In her essay, “Without Knocking: Long Live Mentally
Globalized, Internationalist Germany,” Mária Schmidt quoted the Iranian revolutionary and
cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini: “If Islam is not politics, Islam is nothing.” She then opined, “Yes,
Islam is politics and religion at the same time.”129 The radical right often argues that Islam is
both a religion and an oppressive ideology, and so anti-Islam does not contradict Europe’s
traditions of religious tolerance any more than anti-fascism. West European radical rightists have
even engaged in “homo-nationalism” in which they point to Islamist intolerance of
homosexuality to frame anti-Islam as a civic responsibility.
The Hungarian radical right maintains that it is not racist but is concerned by Middle
Eastern immigration because culture is primordial to a geographic location. On its face, this
“ethnopluralism” does not ascribe value to cultures and ethnicities. Instead, its followers argue
that because one cannot unlearn their culture, and culture provides the foundation upon which
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societal and governmental values stand, the spread of foreign cultures erodes the supports of a
tolerant and unified society. One can see how this argument borders and perhaps overlaps
biological racism. Specifically, the radical right holds that Muslims subscribe to backwards and
authoritarian values, and desire to subjugate Europeans under Sharia Law, or “dhimmitude.” By
contrast, the radical right often maintains that European toleration stems from Christian
secularism.
The radical right therefore rejects the claim that those fleeing poverty and violence have a
universal right to cross borders. While it is unfortunate that there is a war in Syria, the sovereign
nation’s desire to remain homogenous outweighs the plight of the refugee. In the words of
Orbán, “I am convinced that Hungary has the right—and every nation has the right—to say that
it does not want its country to change.”130 In the radical right’s view, nationality and culture are
not artificial constructs to be overcome, but inherent in the unconscious memory of a nation
which is irrevocably tethered to its forbears, national heritage, and geography. To the radical
right the Carpathians and the Danube are not just geographic features but a fortress which
defended Christian Hungary for a thousand years against Mongols and Ottomans.
In the words of some Hungarians, this framing of immigration and the right of a nation
to remain homogenous draws on Hungary’s history of external domination. In 2018 VPRO
interviewed two Hungarian college students about why the government was so popular. The first
student claimed that the government made itself popular by instilling Hungarians with the fear
that dark-skinned people would take away their jobs.131 Thus Fidesz could define itself in
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contrast to the mainstream left which is silent on the apparent threat of immigration. The
interviewer turned to the second man, a law student who said he wanted stay in Hungary in part
to counteract the Hungarian brain drain which began in 1990. He explained that while fear of
outside forces galvanized government support, the government had not invented that fear;
instead, he attributed it to Hungary’s historical memory and narrative: “Hungarian history was
totally different from Western history... We were under the oppression of the Turkish empire…
then under the oppression of the Austrian kings. So, the Hungarian soul, at least my soul, is
totally different from a Western—like from a French person’s.”132 Another way of framing it is
that the Hungarian experience is in some ways similar to those of nations which European
empires colonized.
In Hungary’s historical narrative, its suspicion is a hard-learned lesson from its history.
According to István Rév, a Hungarian scholar and archivist, what makes this narrative so
compelling is that “although it seems that we Hungarians have always been victims, in fact we
have always been martyrs and heroes. And to a certain extent, even today we are heroes.”133 Like
the Serbian nationalist narrative of its defeat against the Ottomans at the Battle of Kosovo in
1389, the story of a defeat can be inspiring by coloring the nation’s historical perseverance with
the language of redemption. Australians, for example, celebrate ANZAC Day every spring to
commemorate the Australian volunteers who died in Britain’s disastrous invasion of Ottoman
Gallipoli during World War I. Frank Bongiorno writes that in Australian memory April 25th,
1915, the day of the ANZAC landing in the Dardanelles, was the day that the modern Australian
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nation was born out of the British Empire in a “baptism of fire.”134 In Hungary’s narrative, on
Europe’s eastern frontier against the Ottoman Empire and Eurasian steppe, Hungarians were
Christian Europe’s guardians from Asiatic hordes who sought to destroy it. Although Hungary
spent much of its history dominated by foreign empires and the Soviet Union it has outlasted
those institutions. Viktor Orbán mobilized this narrative before the European Parliament in 2018
when its members accused the Fidesz regime of violating the rule of law.135 In response Orbán
framed the Parliament’s accusations against the Hungarian government as an attack on the
Hungarian people who had chosen the government. Orbán then warned the Parliament, “You’re
going to denounce Hungary that rebelled and took up arms against the biggest army of the world,
the Soviet army, and shed its blood for freedom and democracy… I stand here today and see
those accusing Hungary are the ones who inherited democracy, who did not have to take
personal risks in order to obtain liberty.”136
Fidesz and its supporters have innovated by mobilizing Hungary’s historical resentment
towards Ottomans, Austrians, and Russians to accuse the European Union, particularly Germany
and the Western European member states, of seeking to vassalize Hungary. In his 2016 speech
commemorating Hungary’s 1848 Revolution, Orbán declared
Europe is not free, because freedom starts with the statement of the truth… It is forbidden
to state that in Brussels they are currently scheming to transport foreigners here as
quickly as possible and to settle them among us. It is forbidden to say that the objective

Frank Bongiorno, “Remembering ANZAC,” in History, Memory, and Public Life: The Past in the Present, ed.
Anna Maerker et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 184.
135
“Rule of law in Hungary: Parliament calls on the EU to act,” News, European Parliament, December 9, 2018,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180906IPR12104/rule-of-law-in-hungary-parliament-callson-the-eu-to-act.
136
“Viktor Orban: "You are condemning Hungary,” EURACTIV, September 11, 2018, Video,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6oqhwvPj5mo.
134

67

of this settlement is to redraw the religious and cultural patterns of Europe, to rebuild its
ethnic footings, thereby eliminating the nation-states that represent the last impediment to
the Internationale.137
With his reference to the “Internationale” or First Communist International, Orbán alluded to the
historical precedent for the West and East colluding against Hungary. In Hungarian history,
perhaps no other event serves as so compelling a metaphor for this supposed siege than the
Treaty of Trianon in 1920. Between 1918 to 1920, Hungary fell from its stature as the eastern
half of the great Austro-Hungarian Empire to a small and weak state surrounded by potentially
aggressive neighbors. Romanian Transylvanians, Czechs, Slovaks, and South Slavs who had
lived beneath the Habsburg monarchy seized the post-war moment and President Woodrow
Wilson’s doctrine of national self determination to gain independence. In the contemporary
radical right’s framing Trianon was not a mutual agreement with the Entente, but a crime
committed against Hungary. As Gábor Gyáni argues, in Hungarian memory there is a “Trianon
syndrome” which has managed to “monopolize and reserve for itself the national claim for the
‘true’ traumatic past.”138 This narrative has gone hand in hand with the nationalization, or
“Magyarization” of twentieth-century Hungarian victimhood.139
In 2020 the Hungarian government commemorated the one hundredth anniversary of
Trianon with a new memorial. Before analyzing the language of 1920/2020 and connecting it to
both immigration and Holocaust remembrance, I will briefly sketch the details of the Treaty of
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Trianon and its cultural impact on Hungary.

Map of the Treaty of Trianon 1920.140

“No! No! Never!”
“The diktat [Trianon] saw two thirds of the country’s territory and 63 per cent of its population shorn from
us; thus, one in three Hungarians found themselves outside our borders. The verdict was obviously a death sentence.
History has not recorded a nation that could survive such a loss of blood. Those responsible for the decision were
versed in history and delivered their verdict in the light of that knowledge.”141
- Viktor Orbán.

The Treaty of Trianon signed June 4, 1920, was one of several post-World War I treaties
which broke up the imperial holdings of the Central Powers, the most famous of which is
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Versailles which many understand as an unnecessarily punitive treaty intended to punish
Germany. Post-war Hungary would have been envious of Germany’s deal. In 1920 the Kingdom
of Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and three fifths of its population.142 To many, what they
knew as Hungary had ceased to exist and what was left was unrecognizable. Maps of the new
Hungary lined the streets with the words, “No! No! Never!”143 At a 1934 diocesan conference to
discuss Hungarian birth-rates a Calvinist priest, Geza Kiss, asked, “What is happening here? The
ancient and pure Hungarian race (az ostiszta magyarfaj), the Reformed community, is on the
verge of extinction, and an ugly (szornyu) mix of peoples is coming for their place… I know of
one village in the Ormanysag, where the gypsies at the edge of the village already have more
children than the entire village.”144 The similarity between how some interwar Hungarians and
the contemporary radical right frame population replacement by minorities is striking.

Interwar Hungarian propaganda papers advocating territorial revisionism.145
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The beginning of the interwar period was a bloody time in Eastern Europe: after the
Great War Hungarians clashed with Romania for control of Transylvania, and Poland struggled
for independence against Stalin and the Red army amidst the Russian Civil War. From
Hungary’s perspective, tectonic forces were shifting that threatened to destroy the isolated
nation. The Treaty of Trianon breached Hungary’s natural defenses of the Carpathians in the
East, and Hungarian politicians feared that they would soon be invaded by communists. Earlier
in the chapter I mentioned the importance of historical defeats in nationalist narratives. The
following description by historian Paul Hanebrink illustrates this tradition in the interwar period:
[Responses] to the Treaty of Trianon… placed the state at the center of a national cult of
martyrdom, in which Hungary was a crucified Christ whose resurrection would come
with the revision of the unjust borders. Numerous commemorative albums, written and
translated into other European languages to publicize the injustice done to Hungary,
depicted the nation, represented pictorially as all the historic crownlands of St. Istvan
before partition, on a cross or with a crown of thorns.146
But Trianon is more complicated. Maps which show Hungary’s old and new borders without
overlays of the region’s demography obscure the fact that while it held no overseas colonies, the
Kingdom of Hungary was nevertheless an empire. Through Trianon millions of people who were
Serbian, Slovakian, and Romanian were repatriated to their nation-states of choice. Each nation
impacted by the treaty has its own Trianon narrative, and Hungary’s is only one of several.
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Trianon 2020: The Year of National Unity
At 4:30 PM on June 4th, 2020, thousands of church bells rang across Hungary to
commemorate the exact moment, one hundred years before, when Hungary signed the Treaty of
Trianon. Then, delayed due to Covid-19, the government inaugurated its new Trianon Memorial
in Budapest on August 20. The monument is a 100-meter by 4-meter ramp near the Parliament
building with dark walls rising on either side. As visitors walk down the ramp, they can read the
names of Hungary’s twelve thousand municipalities etched into the surrounding walls.
Symbolizing national unity, the names of the regions lost in 1920 are displayed alongside those
still within Hungary’s borders. So that there would be no pattern or separation between the
annexed territories and the land Hungary retained, the order of the names of the municipalities
was chosen randomly by an algorithm.147

Trianon Memorial in Budapest nearby the Parliament building.148
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At the monument’s inauguration Viktor Orbán declared, “One hundred years after defeat
in the First World War and the Trianon diktat, today we stand on the stage of European history
as champions of survival…We are sailing in uncharted waters. In our eyes the West has lost its
attraction, and in their eyes the world of Central Europe does not seem to be a desirable one.”149
To Orbán, Hungary’s survival through its political fragmentation in the twentieth century proved
that it could be independent from the vassalage of foreign institutions. In the radical right’s
narrative, during the Cold War Hungarians looked West to liberalism and capitalism, but in the
2000s and 2010s, adopting Western norms came at the cost of ceding sovereignty to the
European Union, as well as adopting multiculturalism which threatened to denationalize Eastern
Europe. In 2020 the Hungarian House Speaker, László Kövér, declared that “Trianon is not
merely an unfinished piece of history but also a present and future European issue… Because
today each and every European nation has to confront the anti-national sentiments threatening
their existence, and in the future all of them will have to fight for the preservation of their own
identity in order to survive.”150 Trianon teaches that Hungary should not trust the promises of
foreign powers, particularly the promise that nationalism is the antithesis of modern European
values, rather than their guardian.
Trianon trauma is pervasive throughout Hungarian society in large part because it has
become divorced from the militarism attached to it in the interwar era. Ignoring calls from the
extreme right, Orbán is satisfied with the current borders of Central-Eastern Europe and has
pursued alternative means to overturn Trianon. In essence, if he cannot regain Hungarian land,
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he can regain its people. In 2010 Fidesz passed a law offering citizenship, voting rights, and
participation in Hungarian social programs to ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring Romania.
Around one million Hungarian Romanians accepted the offer and ninety-five percent of them
vote for Fidesz.151 While dual citizens in Romania, Ukraine, and Serbia can vote my mail,
Hungarian expatriates who the government fears will vote against Fidesz cannot.152 Aside from
Fidesz’s strategic goal in gaining roughly one million extra votes in a country with a population
smaller than ten million, the law also fits into Orbán’s stated vision of a nationalist, illiberal,
albeit quasi-democratic government. Another example of Orbán’s policy of cross-borders
national unity was his support in 2020 for VMSZ, a Hungarian political party running in the
upcoming Serbian elections. Interviewer Zoltán Kozma asked Orbán why it was important for
Hungarians to seek national representation in countries where they are a minority. Orbán
responded that “we Hungarians… [are] a cultural and linguistic island here in the middle of
Europe… If our communities are absorbed, assimilated and merged, they will lose their
Hungarian culture and the Hungarian language: we will simply disappear.”153
The Hungarian National Museum echoed these sentiments in its 2020 temporary exhibit
on Trianon trauma and culture, writing that “The exhibition renders the talent and creativity of
Hungarian people visible, and makes us aware that preserving the Hungarian spiritual unity takes
active effort, and that the living cultural heritage of the community shall be passed on.”154
Similar to 2014’s theme of Holocaust remembrance and subsequent reconciliation between
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Hungary and the Jewish community, the government declared 2020 to be a year of national
unity. Although Hungary no longer covets its lost land, the map of its old borders—chosen by
the Hungarian National Museum to advertise its exhibit—is not merely a far-right symbol but a
mainstream image which represents the resilience of the Hungarian spirit across borders. And
because, according to the government, one does not cease to be a Hungarian when he or she no
longer lives within the state—even if they have never visited post-Trianon Hungary—it is the
government’s duty to represent them all.
The radical right did not so much create Trianon trauma has harness its symbolism and
emotional gravity. As Jan-Werner Müller has pointed out, in Hungary it is extremely common to
see license plates imprinted with maps of the Hungarian crownlands.155 A documentary about
Trianon by the Hungarian magazine, Index, explained how after the fall of communism the
repressed feelings about Trianon “broke free,” and suddenly cars became plastered with greaterHungary bumper-stickers. Notably, however, the left-wing MSZP chose not to employ Trianon
symbolism due to its nationalistic overtones.156 Anna Menyhert, a scholar of Hungary, includes
an anecdote in her article, “The Image of the ‘Maimed Hungary’ in the 20th Century,” in which
her eleven-year-old son returned from school on a Trianon memorial-day, shaken, and explained
that the teacher had played the class a song about Trianon with the lines: “There is no place for
me on earth / where I could lay my head. / A border separates me from my / sweetheart (…) /
Borders won’t separate us, we speak the same language, for god’s sake! / Hungarians suffer from
Trianon, / Tell me, why did we allow this to happen, / why?”157 In class her son had seen posters
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showing bloody hands tearing out pieces of Hungary from its map, and he wanted to know what
he could do to stop them.158
While Trianon is a poignant national symbol regardless of one’s political orientation, the
Hungarian radical right mobilizes it by claiming to identify and combat the figurative bloody
hands which claw at Hungary. To Mária Schmidt, Trianon represents Western Europe’s
historical condescension to the East: The West has “always communicated with the Eastern part
of Europe from the altitude of a podium, the way they always had with their colonies…”159 In the
twenty-first century, the radical right mobilizes Trianon trauma to help it frame the European
Union. In his June 2020 Trianon commemoration speech Prime Minister Orbán accused:
The West raped the thousand-year-old borders and history of Central Europe. They
forced us to live between indefensible borders, deprived us of our natural treasures,
separated us from our resources, and made a death row out of our country. Central
Europe was redrawn without moral concerns, just as the borders of Africa and the Middle
East were redrawn. We will never forget that they did this.160
By mentioning Africa and the Middle East, Orbán framed Trianon as Hungary’s own SykesPicot agreement, in which imperialists supposedly drew lines haphazardly across a map of the
Middle East without regard for the communities they were destroying or geopolitical conflicts
they were brewing. Ultimately, to the radical right the Treaty of Trianon is a symbol of
uncertainty in Central-Eastern Europe. Therefore, Hungarians should not allow politics to divide
them. This is the core of Viktor Orbán’s populism: true Hungarians choose to support Fidesz
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because to oppose it is to sow division which, in the face of the dual threat of the European
Union and mass immigration, could prove deadly to Hungarian independence.
In the Hungarian radical right’s framing, society is divided between Hungarians who are
proud of their history and want their civilization to survive and Hungarians who are ashamed of
their past and see internationalism as the future. Mária Schmidt maintains that one only needs to
look to Germany to see a nation well “On the road to self-destruction.” Schmidt argues, “It is
becoming increasingly evident that the reason for the European community’s lack of a common
army or border control force, indeed for the lack of will or any effort to set up one, is the absence
of commonly held values that its members would see as worthy of protection.”161 Schmidt’s last
clause, “worthy of protection,” is significant because the problem Europe faces is not only a lack
of values, but the delusion that its values are not worth fighting for.
Schmidt’s argument exemplifies British journalist David Goodhart’s theory of twentyfirst century politics that it is divided between “people from somewhere and people from
anywhere.”162 The “anywheres,” according to Goodhart, tend to be highly educated, mobile
people who value openness and are wary of group attachments. By contrast, the “somewheres”
are generally rooted in local communities and value their group attachments. Another way of
looking at this division is Ivan Krastev’s analysis that the East European right mistrusts
bureaucrats with “convertible competencies.” These kinds of people are often highly educated,
multi-lingual and, as Krastev phrases it, equally capable of running a bank in Bulgaria or
Bangladesh.163 The Eastern European right—the “somwheres”—mistrust these elites because
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they suspect that if their country was to suffer an economic crisis, the “anywheres” would
abandon them.
In contrast to modern Germany which is dominated by “anywheres,” Orban explains that
“… we should first of all declare that our political notions have both intellectual and spiritual
foundations. Secondly, we should declare that the past thousand years of Hungarian politics has
always stood on such foundations.”164 To the radical right, the culmination of Hungary’s
historical narrative has been to establish a government of “somewheres,” who are not only driven
by personal gain, or vague liberal-internationalist ideals, but grounded in Hungary by their
loyalty to their ethnicity and Christian faith. To the radical right, shame over the Holocaust and
the notion that the nationalist sentiments which have historically unified Hungarians were
necessary to ostracize interwar Jews, threatens this project. According to Mária Schmidt,
“[Angela] Merkel cannot stand either Germans or Europeans. She is particularly disdainful of
Germans, who will forever remain Nazis and collectively guilty.”165 Schmidt goes on to describe
the recent guilty verdict of a low level Auschwitz administrator in Germany to warn that the
danger of collective guilt is not only that it condemns the innocent, but that it relieves guilt from
the Holocaust’s true perpetrators by placing them on the same plain of culpability as guards and
paper-pushers.166 Although Schmidt does not explicitly reference the Hungarian past in this
section of her essay, we can transpose its argument onto the right’s historiography of Hungary,
which claims that the court of international opinion has laid the crimes of Hitler and Eichmann
wrongly at the feet of Miklos Horthy.
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Maintaining National Unity
“Germany, Europe’s strongest country wears sackcloth and ashes day and night in atonement for the
Holocaust, while the rest of the West is doing so in repentance for its colonial past. As far as we are concerned, we
don’t intend to join that rivalry about whose sins are greater. We believe that the future doesn’t require continuous
atonement from us.”167
- Mária Schmidt.

Although the radical right often frames liberal critiques of Fidesz as foreign and directed
by sinister corporate interests, there is a robust Hungarian scholarly community which challenges
the government’s policies and historiography. One prominent liberal institution was the Central
European University (CEU), which employed István Rév, László Karsai and András Bozóki.
Originally founded by Hungarian born Jewish financier George Soros in 1991, the CEU was
intended to instill Hungarians with liberal-democratic values that would guide a new elite to
democratic governance following the transition from communism. As its rector, Michael
Ignatieff has explained, the intention for the university was not to condescendingly explain
democracy to Eastern-Europeans, but to ensure that the young and essentially rootless Hungarian
democracy was not exploited.168 Pointing to its liberal political leanings, and the image of its
émigré founder Soros and Canadian Rector Ignatieff, Fidesz has painted the university as a
globalist-socialist colony on Hungarian soil. Indeed, a favorite saying of Orbán is that “a liberal
is nothing more than a communist with a university degree.”169 Throughout the 2010s the CEU
published papers about Orbán’s authoritarianism and educated young people about feminism and
gender theory. Although this liberal education often came from Hungarian professors, the fact
that it was a foreign institution helped Fidesz to portray it as a Western colonial enclave which
brainwashed Hungarians into abandoning their nationalist and socially conservative values.
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In 2017 the Central European University came under legal attacks from the government
when the National Assembly drafted a bill on higher education declaring that foreign universities
accredited in Hungary must have a campus in their home country. Although the law did not refer
to the CEU explicitly, it was clearly the law’s target as it was based in New York state, but did
not have a campus there. The CEU arrived at a deal with New York Governor Cuomo to set up a
small fifteen-student campus in Bard College, but the Hungarian government refused to back
down and the CEU relocated its primary campus to Vienna.170 The CEU affair demonstrates that
a powerful illiberal democracy can take tangible steps to instate what it vaunts as national unity.
It symbolizes how the government, in its apparent struggle to break free of the chains of leftist
and liberal ideals, is willing to dictate Hungarian patriotism from above.
Fidesz also claims to defend the Hungarian nation from the threat of Muslim invasion. In
2018 Viktor Orbán warned that “everyone should be wary of the idea of Islam being part of any
European country. If Islam is part of Germany, for instance, in Muslim terms this means that
Germany is part of Islam.”171 According to the radical right, Muslim immigration is nothing
short of the pre-cursor to the destruction of Hungary. First, Muslims will vote their own parties
into parliament. Then, according to Mária Schmidt, once they have surpassed the Christian
population in number through their higher birthrates, they will deprive “us indigenous ChristianJewish populations of our land as early as in the near future. All this is underway in front of our
eyes and with precious support by our political and media elites consisting of left-wing, sixty-
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eighter ‘useful idiots.”172 But the Muslims are only pawns in the cosmic plot of George Soros.
Having used his wealth and political influence to indoctrinate Hungarian politicians with
Holocaust guilt and multi-culturalism, the Jewish financier will supposedly capitalize on the
destruction and Islamization of European institutions to steal for himself the wealth of European
nations.173 In 2018 Fidesz plastered Hungarian public spaces with posters of a cackling George
Soros. It named its 2018 anti-immigration legislation the “Stop Soros Package.”

Anti-Soros campaign poster. “99 percent reject illegal migration. Don’t let Soros get the last laugh.”174

Ironically, while Mária Schmidt criticizes liberals for holding people accountable for the
crimes of their fathers she also asks, “Does Chancellor Merkel know, when she talks, as usual,
about the sins of Europe and those of the Germans, that in the 17th and the 18th centuries
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Saracens (Muslims) took masses of Christians into slavery from Italy? Does she know that they
were sold, in chains, on slave markets in Algiers, Tunis, Tangier and Constantinople?”175 At the
heart of the radical right’s ideology is its unwillingness to see Muslims as individuals and to
comprehend their predicaments. Islamist states and the Muslims who live within them are
indivisible to the radical right, and so Muslim immigrants will necessarily create a Europe in
which minarets replace church towers and women will wear burkas to be safe in public.176 This
conspiracy theory manifests in policies that prevent refugees from war-torn Syria, Iraq, and
Afghanistan from reaching safety. Hungary’s location on the south-eastern border of the EU with
Serbia makes it the first EU member state migrants encounter that is attached by land to
wealthier nations such as Austria. Reports emerged in 2018 that Hungary was only admitting two
asylum seekers per day.177 Hundreds of thousands remain trapped in Turkish jails, or in camps
off the coast of Greece in places like Lesbos with little medical attention where they are
vulnerable to sweeping wildfires.178

Conclusion
“… what are we getting from the left?... Pure sanctimony. Pure judgement. You are not good enough.
You’re guilty, not only for your own sins, but the sins of your fathers. The crimes of slavery and colonialism are on
your head… Tear down those statues and bend the fucking knee.”
- Sam Harris on the rise of Donald Trump.179

Maria Schmidt, “On The Way To Self-Destruction, Part I.”
Maria Schmidt, “An Orphaned Legacy: Masterplan – Merkelplan? A Critique Of De-Christianisation Through
Migration In Germany,” Hungary Today, May 17, 2016, https://hungarytoday.hu/orphaned-legacy-masterplanmerkelplan-critique-de-christianisation-migration-germany-62484/.
177
Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “Hungary Reduces Number of Asylum-Seekers It Will Admit to 2 Per Day,” NPR,
February 3, 2018. https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/02/03/582800740/hungary-reduces-number-ofasylum-seekers-it-will-admit-to-2-per-day.
178
“Moria migrants: Fire destroys Greek camp leaving 13,000 without shelter,” BBC News, BBC, September 9,
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54082201.
179
“The Key to Trump’s Appeal: A Selection from Sam Harris’s Making Sense Podcast (November 3, 2020),”
Likeville, November 6, 2020, https://www.likevillepodcast.com/articles/2020/11/12/the-key-to-trumps-appeal-aselection-from-sam-harriss-making-sense-podcast-november-3-2020.
175
176

82

Ivan Krastev has argued that the policies of Fidesz mark the end of an Age of Imitation in
which post-communist Eastern Europe sought to model itself economically and politically after
the liberal-democratic and capitalist West. This process, he explains, generated latent resentment
that was inherent due to its implications of Eastern European backwardness: “the project of
adopting a Western model under Western supervision feels like a confession of having failed to
escape Central Europe’s historical vassalage to foreign instructors and inquisitors.”180 Despite
the West’s promises of a better world the 1990s saw income inequality and poverty skyrocket
across the post-communist world, while average life expectancy plummeted. For many
Hungarians, poverty and corruption were the experiences that accompanied the political rhetoric
of Western liberalism and Orbán has since identified higher education as a center from which
this supposed elitism emanates from.
According to the Hungarian government’s ideology, survival in a post-Trianon, post-Cold
War world requires national unity. For the nation to be unified it must root out political dissent—
if possible, by framing it as a disingenuous beachhead for foreign interests. It also means
disputing historiography which holds that Hungarian nationalism historically led to the political
exclusion of the Hungarian Jewish community, which was a pre-condition for the ferocity of the
Hungarian Holocaust on the scale it occurred.
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Conclusion: Memory
While many other details and paradoxes of Hungarian communism have faded with time
in the twenty-first century, the legacy of Imre Nagy, the 1956 revolutionary, complicates the
radical right’s narrative of leftism as foreign and anti-Hungarian. Speaking before the nation for
the first time in 1989, Viktor Orbán praised Nagy for fighting to liberate Hungary from Soviet
domination; his legacy lent weight and symbolism to Hungary’s second anti-communist moment.
However, as Fidesz radicalized on the right during the 2010s, it identified Nagy’s story as
contradictory to Hungary’s nationalistic message. In 1956 Hungarians resisted Stalinist terror
and Soviet domination by rallying behind a left-wing leader, contradicting the radical right’s
narrative that liberalism and Soviet communism are in essence the same idea. In the pre-morning
darkness of December 28, 2018 Fidesz silently removed Nagy’s statue from its prominent home
in Kossuth Square, near the Parliament building.181
According to the radical right European liberals have taken on the mantle of Soviet
communism and threaten to erode Hungarian national identity and independence. In the words of
Mária Schmidt, “Those [leftist] elites consider the end of World War Two as year zero, because
they reject all the preceding two thousand years…”182 In other words, Holocaust guilt has
convinced liberals that nothing is worth salvaging from European history before 1945, thus
paving the way for them to adopt utopian and internationalist ideals borrowed from Soviet
communism. We can see this as a reaction to the left’s post-communist politics of inevitability:
that there is no alternative to liberalism.183 To the radical right there is an alternative: states
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should embrace national divisions rather than overcome them because the principles of a national
government are derived from its history and cultural traditions, which are unique to geographic
location; nationalism is the antidote to internationalist, atheistic totalitarianism which caused
twentieth century atrocity.
Lending credence to the claim that fascism and communism are fundamentally similar
due to their totalitarianism, Mária Schmidt has quoted the Hungarian Holocaust survivor and
author Imre Kertész: “deportation from human existence; misery, hunger, slavery and death in
Recsk are the same as in Dachau; nor is there any difference between Kolima and Mauthausen in
this respect... There is no way of measuring suffering, no degrees for injustice. Both the Gulag
and the network of Nazi camps were set up for the same purpose, and the millions of victims
bear evidence of its fulfillment.”184 While we can agree that to the people who suffered there was
no moral distinction between fascism and Stalinism, we should remember that they mobilized
people based on extremes of very different ideological sentiments. In the words of Tony Judt,
“we must keep in view a crucial analytical contrast: there is a difference between regimes that
exterminate people in the inhuman pursuit of an arbitrary objective and those whose objective is
extermination itself.”185
In the House of Terror, right-wing historians claimed that Nazism and communism were
both, at their core, atheistic. The antithesis of totalitarianism, the museum claimed, was the
Christian idea of individual responsibility. Also implicit in the museum’s presentation is the
parallel that both the Nazis and the communists destroyed Hungarian sovereignty. And by
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parsing a small cadre of fascist and communist collaborators form Hungarian society at large, it
completely ignored Hungary’s voluntary cooperation with Hitler in the Second World War.
During the Holocaust Memorial Year of 2014, the radical right nationalized the narrative
of the Holocaust by framing the Hungarian nation and its sovereignty as the victims of German
occupation, rather than Jews in particular. It thereby shifted responsibility for the Hungarian
Holocaust entirely onto Nazi Germany. The year’s second event, the House of Fates, sought to
symbolize that Hungary’s reconciliation and acceptance of its Jewish community was complete,
and that anti-Semitism was an ugly chapter that Hungary should leave behind, despite the
government’s continuing anti-Semitism—George Soros as a case in point. The danger of
claiming this victim status is that it frees the Hungarian radical right from analyzing the fact that
through nationalism many Hungarian victims were also perpetrators during the Holocaust.
The radical right’s 2020 commemoration of the Treaty of Trianon blamed Hungary’s
interwar predicament on “western minds,” thereby mobilizing Trianon trauma as evidence that
contemporary liberalism is the intellectual vanguard of Western imperialism. And against the
fabricated crisis of population replacement by Muslims, the radical right has insisted that
Hungarians should not interrogate historical prejudice, much less speak of collective guilt for the
Holocaust, because it is merely a leftist shame-tactic. Historical self-criticism is dangerous,
according to the radical right’s conspiracy theory, because only a nation that is subservient and
wracked with guilt—like Germany—can open its borders to foreigners. We should see this as a
racist view because it assumes that only a Hungary degraded in its self-esteem would be willing
to accept immigrants from a different racial and cultural background.
The radical right’s Holocaust historiography is deeply interconnected with its
Islamophobia. The same principle of Hungarian unconscious memory and unity across borders
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that echoes throughout Orbán’s nationalist rhetoric also informs the radical right’s racist view
that a Muslim cannot make their home in Hungary. Rather than cautiously studying the parallels
between Islamophobia and the historic right’s framing of Jews as an alien spirit or race, the
radical right defines the historic Hungarian right in contrast to and as a victim of Nazism. It
thereby refuses to approach the historical question of how the Holocaust was carried out so
quickly and brutally amidst the chaos of 1944 on the Eastern Front, and while the Nazis were
cautious of igniting a Hungarian rebellion. Christian conservatives and militaristic radical
rightists began isolating Hungarian Jews from the national community twenty-four years before
the Germans invaded. Whether we interpret this as proof of Hungarian collective guilt is another
conversation and beyond my overall point; we should not view twentieth century right-wing
totalitarianism as wholly separate from the “respectable” Hungarian political establishment that
fascists eventually overthrew. Interwar mainstream nationalism influenced the Hungarian
Holocaust even if it did not directly cause it.
In my preface I mentioned that my experience as an American makes my perspective
valuable. As an American I have tried to balance national pride and respect for the framers of the
Constitution with the knowledge that they horrifically contradicted their ideals. Nobody wants to
be told that their ancestors were slave-owners or complicit in the Holocaust. But to understand
the role of legislation and prejudice in the Holocaust first demands that Hungarians acknowledge
that its governing institutions were largely complicit. As in so much Holocaust literature—much
of it centered around Arendt’s thesis of the Banality of Evil and Christopher Browning’s
Ordinary Men—the question is not only “why did bad people plan atrocity,” but “why did
ordinary people go along with it?” My purpose is not to make people feel ashamed—to do so
only fuels the resentment behind the radical right. Instead, I hoped to demonstrate that the
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Hungarian government’s public history, which it has made mainstream, is a politically motivated
right-wing revision. For the Hungarian opposition to succeed, it must articulate both a self-image
and a vision of Hungary’s past that is not anathema to the Hungarian radical right’s emphasis on
national pride, but nonetheless studies the past critically. The radical right’s historiography is an
extreme, but it need not be met with an opposite extreme. We can both combat the radical right’s
historiography which is destructive and at the same time maintain that being proud of one’s
nation is not a crime in and of itself.

Afterward
By inventing the threat of the EUSSR and the dangers of European integration and
Muslim immigration, Orbán fabricates the necessity of his own leadership, all while accepting
significant EU funding for Hungarian government projects. How can Hungarians weaken his
hold on power? The 1989 revolution offers us some lessons. First, when the communists
lessened restrictions on free speech, the ability of the opposition to communicate with the likeminded and articulate their dissenting views was instrumental. In Hungary today, upwards of
seventy percent of the press is loyal to the government.186 For the opposition to succeed it must
find ways to support independent media. In 2006 and 2008, Orbán outflanked the conservative
right by capitalizing on the left-wing government’s corruption scandals and claiming that it was
not only an ineffective government but an illegitimate one. These circumstances demanded
radical solutions which Fidesz claimed the sole ability to provide. Ironically, Fidesz today is
horrifically corrupt. Bálint Magyar has written two books about Orbán’s connections to
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Hungarian oligarchs, many of whom are his personal friends: The Hungarian Octopus and The
Post-Communist Mafia State. One does not need an entire book, however, to offer a sample of
the government’s corruption, only a newspaper article, radio show, or podcast.
Another lesson from 1989 is that Hungarian political parties from both the left and right
should cooperate if they are to stand a chance. In 1989 social democrats, conservatives, and
radical rightists such as István Csurka collaborated and accepted the results of the 1990 election.
Conversely, it was the inability of the social democrats and the communists in the Weimar
Republic to overcome their differences that provided the Nazi Party with the strength to enter
government in 1933. In 2021 there is a glimmer of hope that the Hungarian opposition will unite
as the historically extreme right Jobbik and the liberal Democratic Coalition, as well as four
other parties, have announced their backing of a single candidate to oust Orbán in the 2022
election.187
Another way that the Fidesz state could collapse is beneath the weight of its own
promises of prosperity. While Fidesz has taken the Covid-19 pandemic seriously, offering
generous stimulus to the population and implementing lockdowns, the economic fallout has
nonetheless damaged the government’s popularity. Between May of 2020 and April of 2021,
Fidesz sank from fifty-two percent popularity to forty-six percent, now beneath the united
opposition whose combined popularity is projected at forty-nine percent.188 Furthermore, in its
Islamophobic rhetoric Fidesz overlooks the economic incentives of immigration. With declining
birthrates across the EU, economists project that the continent will soon suffer from labor
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shortages and that younger generations will bear the economic burden of a growing elderly
population that is no longer in the work force. In 2019 Fidesz sparked significant antigovernment protests towards a “slave law” enabling employers to request up to four hundred
hours of overtime per-year.189 In addition to the labor unions, Fidesz must now also face the
Momentum party, a growing group of young, educated parliamentarians who reject the labels of
“liberal” and “left.” In the words of Hungarian author Stephan Ozsvath, Momentum claims, “We
don’t want to leave Hungary. We want a future here.”190 Only one in three Hungarians aged 1829 support Fidesz, indicating that, all things constant, Fidesz’s popularity will fade with time.191
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Appendix 1: Holocaust Timeline
1918-1920: Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.
June 4, 1920: Treaty of Trianon is signed at Versailles, France.
1920: Numerus Clausus laws pass in Hungary
January 30, 1933: Adolf Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany.
1934: Hungary signs economic agreement with Germany.
September 15, 1935: Nazi Germany passes the Nuremberg Laws.
1938-1941: Hungary expands territorially through its alliance with Nazi Germany, acquires
portions of Czechoslovakia (1938), Romania (1940), and Yugoslavia (1941).
March 5, 1938: Hungarian government announces the Győr Program, which is followed by the
anti-Semitic laws of 1938-1939.
1939: Hungary joins the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Japan.
August 23, 1939: Germany and the USSR sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
September 1, 1939: Nazi Germany invades Poland.
April 6, 1941: Nazi Germany invades Greece and Yugoslavia.
June 22, 1941: Axis forces invade the Soviet Union. German mobile killing units begin
massacring Jews, around 1.25 million by September 1943.
July 31, 1941: Reinhard Heydrich announces plans for the “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem
in Europe.”
August 27-28, 1941: Einsatzgruppen massacre Carpathian Ruthenian Jews deported by Hungary
to Kamianets-Podilskyi, Ukrainian SSR.
January 20, 1942: The Wannsee Conference. Nazi leaders discuss details to implement the “Final
Solution.”
January 23, 1942: Occupying Hungarian troops massacre around 1,000 Jews at Novi Sad, Serbia.
January 1943: Axis forces are defeated at the Battle of Stalingrad which is the turning point on
the Eastern Front.
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March 1944: German forces invade Hungary. The Hungarian government orders its troops not to
resist.
March 31, 1944: Hungary orders all Jews to wear yellow stars.
May-July 1944: Adolf Eichmann leads the deportations of rural Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.
June 6, 1944: Allied invasion of Western Europe begins.
October 6, 1944: Soviet troops enter Hungarian borders.
October 15, 1944: Horthy announces Hungarian defection to the USSR. Hitler supports an
Arrow Cross coup which topples the Horthy regime and rules what remains of Hungary.
October 16, 1944: The Arrow Cross regime begins the mass shooting of Budapest Jews on the
banks of the Danube river.
January 18, 1945: The Soviet Red Army captures Budapest.
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Appendix 2: USHMM Hungarian Holocaust Resources and Responses:
The Holocaust in Hungary: Frequently Asked Questions:
https://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online-exhibitions/special-focus/the-holocaustin-hungary/the-holocaust-in-hungary-frequently-asked-questions.
The Holocaust in Hungary: An Introduction:
https://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online-exhibitions/special-focus/the-holocaustin-hungary/the-holocaust-in-hungary-an-introduction.
USHMM Response to the House of Fates: https://www.ushmm.org/information/press/pressreleases/museum-calls-on-hungarian-government-to-honor-commitments-made-on-holocaust.
USHMM Response to Fidesz’s Rehabilitation of Regent Horthy:
https://www.ushmm.org/information/press/press-releases/museum-condemns-attempts-torehabilitate-hungarian-fascist-leader.
USHMM on Statue of Hungarian Anti-Semite Balint Homan:
https://www.ushmm.org/information/press/press-releases/museum-warns-of-danger-inhungarian-plan-to-honor-antisemitic-holocaust-era.

